"Super-loyal" voting in Russia's federal subjects: Ethnic and administrative factors

Vorobyov N.I., Kiselyov K.V., Kovin V.S., Korgunyuk Yu.G., Mikhailov V.V., Panov P.V., Shkel S.N.

Abstract

Election experts examine the phenomenon of "super-loyal voting" observed in several of Russia's federal subjects. The analysis focuses on factors contributing to such voting patterns (ethical, social, political) as well as mechanisms producing them (voter bribery, voter coercion, violation of ballot secrecy, direct falsification).

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Editor's note

For years (dating back to at least 2003), certain Russian regions (federal subjects) have exhibited the phenomenon of "super-loyal" voting — that is, significantly higher-than-national-average support levels for United Russia in State Duma elections and for the incumbent candidate (Vladimir Putin or Dmitry Medvedev) in presidential elections, as well as for the 2020 constitutional amendments.

To proceed with our analysis, we must first establish what constitutes "super-loyal" levels of support for the authorities. This depends in part on the average performance of the "party of power" or its candidate. The indicators were selected in such a way as to yield between 11 and 14 regions demonstrating "super-loyal" voting patterns in all instances (excluding autonomous okrugs dissolved during 2003-2008 and regions added in 2014 and 2022). This represents an excess over the national average (as a percentage of participating voters) by 16%pts. in the 2011 State Duma elections, 15%pts. in the 2021 State Duma elections, 10%pts. in the 2003, 2007, and 2016 State Duma elections as well as the 2012 presidential election, 8%pts. in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections, 7.5%pts. in the 2020 constitutional amendments vote, 5%pts. in the 2018 presidential election, and 3%pts. in the 2024 presidential election. In nearly every case a high level of support for the authorities is accompanied by a very high turnout, so that in percentage of the list of voters the gap from the average indicators is even higher.

However, it would be more accurate to refer not to voters’ "super-loyal" voting behavior, but rather to "super-loyal vote returns", meaning the figures officially recorded in election commission protocols. These "super-returns" reflect not so much the genuine political engagement or loyalty of voters, but rather the excessive efforts of electoral administrators — efforts that often exceed legally established norms.

The list of regions exhibiting "super-loyalty" across 11 elections over two decades demonstrated notable stability. In all 11 cases, "super-loyalty" was demonstrated by the republics of Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Tuva, and Chechnya. In 10 cases, by the republics of Ingushetia and Mordovia (except in 2024), as well as Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (except in 2003). In 9 cases, by the Karachay-Cherkess and Tatarstan republics (except in 2020 and 2024). In 8 cases, by the Republic of Bashkortostan (except in 2003, 2016 and 2018) and Kemerovo Oblast (except in 2004, 2008 and 2011). In 7 cases, by Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (except in 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2021).

A number of other regions demonstrated "super-loyalty" in a smaller number of cases. Republic of North Ossetia–Alania demonstrated five such cases (in 2003, 2004, 2011, 2016 and 2021). The Republic of Kalmykia (in 2003, 2011 and 2016), Tambov Oblast (in 2011, 2018 and 2020) and Tyumen Oblast without autonomous okrugs (in 2003, 2008, 2020) each demonstrated three cases, while the Republic of Adygea (in 2003 and 2021), Krasnodar Krai (in 2020 and 2024) and Saratov Oblast (in 2016 and 2024) demonstrated two each. Cases of "super-loyalty" were detected once each in Astrakhan Oblast (2020), Belgorod Oblast (2024), Bryansk Oblast (2020), Penza Oblast (2016), and Rostov Oblast (2024), as well as in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (2024).

Our findings demonstrate that of the 12 regions that exhibited "super-loyalty" in most cases, 9 were republics. This pattern was first observed in the early 2000s, prompting the development of explanatory frameworks that emphasize ethnicity as a factor in "super-loyal" voting behavior. Such an approach, however, invites justified skepticism. The data reveal that nine republics (out of 21) were never recorded as demonstrating "super-loyal" voting behavior. At the same time, the group of "super-loyal" regions consistently includes Kemerovo Oblast and two autonomous okrugs: one (Yamalo-Nenets AO) where the titular ethnic group constitutes 6% of the population, and another (Chukotka AO) where it constitutes 28%. When examining the list of 13 regions that made less frequent displays of "super-loyalty", we find Krasnodar Krai, eight oblasts, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (where the titular ethnic group constitutes less than 1% of the population). The majority of these regions only began displaying "super-loyal" voting patterns in recent years.

The idea of "super-loyalty" stems from a distinct political culture of certain ethnic groups or specific regions also contradicts the analysis of electoral statistics over a broader time period. For example, in Dagestan during the 1990s, support levels for the "party of federal power" and its candidates were typically below the national average, while turnout rates were only slightly higher than the all-Russian level. At the same time, there were no instances of consolidated voting during this period (the highest level of consolidation being the vote for Zyuganov in the first round of 1996 at 63%), with significant variations between districts. However, these variations cannot be explained by ethnic factors [18: 282–291].

Another example is Kemerovo Oblast, which until 2000 consistently recorded lower turnout rates than the Russian average. Furthermore, electoral support for the "party of federal power" and its candidates regularly either trailed national averages (1993, 1995, 1996, 2000) or matched them (2004, 2008). It was not until 2012 that the region began exhibiting consistent "super-loyal" electoral behavior [18: 277–279].

Academic works discuss these issues from various perspectives. As early as 2005, researchers identified a negative correlation between voter turnout in federal elections and both Russian-ethnic and urban population shares [1], suggesting that ethnic minority and rural voters were more responsive to mobilization efforts. However, subsequent findings revealed that effective voter mobilization could also occur in highly urbanized regions (Kemerovo Oblast, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug).

Researchers attribute the "party of power's" electoral success to various factors: voter mobilization [21; 23; 24; 30], patron-clientelism [7], institutional "political machines" [4; 9; 10; 11; 28] as well as verifiable instances of ballot manipulation [5; 17; 20; 22; 27].

In 2024, three books addressing governance and electoral issues in Russian regions were published. Of particular significance is Stanislav Shkel’s "Bound by a Single Net. Elections, the Ethnic Factor and Patronal Politics in the Russian Regions" [25] (see also Guzel Garifullina’s review [8]). After polling experts across nine republics (including six "super-loyal" cases as per our interpretation), the author performed in-depth analysis of mechanisms for achieving state-desired electoral outcomes in five republics (with only Bashkortostan and Tatarstan exhibiting "super-loyal" characteristics). The author found that ethnic factors affect high turnout and strong electoral results for the authorities indirectly (by means of dense social networks rather than cultural or religious aspects), while the structure of regional and local elites and the strategy of the regional leader should be considered as the primary factors. The book also documents electoral mobilization of employees at production facilities or various organizations as well as students through pressure from management. Although the book focuses exclusively on ethnic republics (and a subset of those at that), its conclusions may also apply to other regions.

Another key work is Natalia Forrat's study [6], which examines "political machines" in four Russian regions (Tatarstan, Altai Republic, Kemerovo Oblast, and Rostov Oblast). Equally important is Alexander Kynev's "The Whos and the Hows of Managing Russia's Federal Subjects" [16], which offers valuable analysis of regional power structures and local elites. However, this book pays little attention to electoral processes proper, unlike Kynev's earlier work [15: 744–772] that detailed regional governors' role in delivering state-approved electoral outcomes.

Nevertheless, despite the abundance of literature, many aspects of "super-loyalty" remain unclear. This applies both to factors influencing the manifestation of "super-loyalty" and to the mechanisms for achieving it. We therefore surveyed seven regional election experts with a series of questions.

In total, we posed 10 questions and received responses from seven experts.

Question 1. Why do ethnic republics feature so prominently among regions exhibiting "super-loyal" voting patterns?

Vitalii S. Kovin

One can agree with S.Shkel's assessment about the influence of denser social networks in ethnic republics, where administrative mobilization and control extend beyond government employees, workers at large enterprises and corporations and territorial election commission members — reaching even small business owners and precinct election commission members. The administrative signal penetrates more deeply in tight-knit ethnic social networks than in sparser ones.

Yurii G. Korgunyuk

I assume the "super-loyalty" phenomenon stems from three main factors: 1) density of kinship-based social networks; 2) high levels of political apathy (de facto absenteeism); 3) existence of an established "falsification vertical". That said, the latter two factors are mandatory, while the first is optional, yet particularly evident in ethnic republics characterized by denser kinship networks than "Russian" regions.

These networks foster a distinct political culture characterized by: 1) inherent inequality of rights, e.g., age-based hierarchies where older people have more rights, etc.; 2) clustering around "clan" ("kin") leaders who represent the network in the outside world; 3) inward focus with relative indifference to external affairs; 4) non-perception of network-serving actions as corrupt (what is done in the interests of these networks or what does not affect these interests in any way is not considered corruption).

This political culture makes electoral mobilization easier whenever "clan" leaders deem it necessary, while simultaneously enabling high absenteeism when leaders see no "clan" interest. Such absenteeism creates a vacuum easily filled by falsified results that benefit specific groups (including clan networks) — especially when there is an established "falsification vertical".

As a result, some ethnic republics show unusually high support not just for the "party of power" (where many clan leaders are represented), but also marginal parties, exemplified by the Patriots of Russia's successful performance in North Ossetia.

Konstantin V. Kiselyov

There appears to be several causes. While not always simultaneously present in every region, they can combine to amplify the "super-loyal" voting effect. That said, these causes are typically unrelated to ethnicity per se. Let us outline just a few.

First, power in ethnic republics is often monolithic, with conflicts and divisions either absent or thoroughly concealed (the most striking example being the Chechen Republic). This monolithic nature serves as a fundamental resource for suppressing opposition voices and orchestrating "super-loyal" voting.

Second, in ethnic republics, business interests are typically more tightly "stringed" to political power than in most other regions. Consequently, even when competing economically, actors unite around political "directives" from regional authorities during electoral campaigns, ensuring compliant voting among dependent constituencies (e.g. Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, etc.).

Third, education levels and — more broadly — political culture sometimes play a role, particularly the absence such traditions as civic engagement and political advocacy (e.g. Tuva, etc.).

Fourth, certain ethnic republics are often treated by federal authorities as an electoral reserve for delivering required nationwide results; republican governments are consequently "permitted" to employ any election practices that secure these outcomes. This arrangement is further reinforced by regional authorities guaranteeing the absence of post-election protest activity, as they normally do.

Fifth, ethnicity’s direct influence on "super-loyalty" operates exclusively through clan-based and/or religious mobilization mechanisms.

Stanislav N. Shkel

My research leads me to conclude that ethnicity itself constitutes neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for reproducing electoral "super-loyalty". The decisive factor is elite consolidation within a unified patronal network [12], which requires both a dominant political player and their capacity to establish control over key economic assets and political actors. During the democratization and market reforms of the 1990s, political elites in several ethnic republics leveraged ethnicity as a bargaining chip with the Kremlin to obtain political and economic autonomy, which enabled them to implement reforms more gradually. As a result, unlike federal authorities and most "typical" Russian regions that followed Moscow’s lead, many leaders of ethnic republics rejected large-scale privatization and largely preserved, with little change, the Soviet-era management system in key industrial and agricultural sectors (see [11] for details). This allowed them to maintain control over the political and economic elites, who began to work as a team during the elections and could easily mobilize voters in the industrial and agrarian enterprises. At the same time, several governors managed to build a similar model of control without the ethnic factor in their respective regions. Kemerovo Oblast and Moscow's political machine under Yuri Luzhkov serve as prime examples in this regard. Moreover, some ethnic republics lean more toward protest voting than loyalty. For instance, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of Chuvashia and Yakutia hindered the development of effective political machines in these regions. Nevertheless, in the unique 1990s context, ethnic factors generally enabled regional elites to diverge from Moscow's market reforms and preserve Soviet political and economic foundations. Consequently, ethnicity is not the key factor explaining the reproduction of electoral "super-loyalty". However, during the first post-Soviet decades, ethnicity was a critical enabler for regional elites to build effective political machines. This is why the ethnic factor cannot be ignored when analyzing why so many ethnic republics are "super-loyal" when it comes to voting.

Valentin V. Mikhailov

The answer lies in the 1990-1991 "parade of sovereignties" by Russia's republics and subsequent bilateral treaty negotiations with Moscow.

Tatarstan led this sovereignty movement by refusing to sign the Treaty of Federation and demanding a separate equal-status agreement. For this purpose, it exerted pressure on the Centre by controlling the voting in the republic. Tatarstan's turnout was 2-3 times below Russia's average during key federal votes: presidential election on 12 June 1991, public confidence referendum for Yeltsin on 25 April 1993, constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections on 12 December 1993. This sharply differentiated Tatarstan from other entities. The blatant use of administrative power to undermine free and fair elections was obvious. Moscow understood this well. Moreover, despite respective rulings by Russia's Constitutional Court, Supreme Soviet, and a presidential decree of 21 February 1992, Tatarstan held its sovereignty referendum.

After the February 1994 bilateral treaty signing, all these electoral sins were forgiven. What remained was an understanding that to Moscow, political agreements mattered more than electoral law compliance. Meanwhile, other future "super-loyal" Russian regions showed average performance during this period.

Then in 1995-2000, Tatarstan indicated the highest results, which were achieved at the expense of rural districts where turnout and pro-government voting exceeded urban areas by 20–30%, reaching 90–95% or higher. Again, violation of free election standards is obvious. However, high results are convenient for Moscow, and its inaction effectively endorses these electoral anomalies. Other regions that gained autonomy through separate treaties with Moscow began emulating this model. This much is clear through examples of Bashkortostan and Kabardino-Balkaria. Later, other Russian regions adopted these practices regardless of their success in securing individual agreements with Moscow. The list includes Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Mordovia, Saratov, Kemerovo, and Tyumen Oblasts.

Achieving high results through any means, including illegal pressure and fraudulent practices in federal elections, became a channel for regions to establish favorable relations with Moscow. This practice went unpunished for its perpetrators, facilitating its gradual spread across Russia.

The aforementioned "super-loyal" Russian regions share authoritarian governance styles and particularly rigid leadership approaches.

Conversely, republics with small titular ethnic populations (Karelia, Komi, Udmurtia, Khakasia) maintained certain elements of free speech and democracy.

Question 2. What are the common features of regions exhibiting "super-loyalty"?

Yurii G. Korgunyuk

As noted before, these include high de facto absenteeism and an operational "falsification vertical".

Valentin V. Mikhailov

Authoritarian leadership. This results in even tighter press restrictions and more dependent courts than in other regions. How authoritarian governance emerged in each specific case is its own issue.

Vitalii S. Kovin

All these regions are "super-managed," and electoral matters are not an exception. The regional administrations there are also ready and capable when it comes to implementing full-scale administrative mobilization, conducting mass falsifications, or combing both approaches without fear of sparking mass voter discontent. And most voters and elites are accepting of these electoral manipulation methods and result-oriented tactics.

Konstantin V. Kiselyov

· Monolithic nature — if not of political elites, then of "political policy";

· voter dependence on one or few economic actors;

· near-total absence of civic/political engagement traditions;

· in most cases, economic (public funding, etc.) dependence on federal authorities;

· well-established electoral mobilization mechanisms.

Stanislav N. Shkel

The common feature is a dominant actor represented by the head of the region and a consolidated (rather than fragmented) political elite. The strategies and conditions for building this "single pyramid" of elite networks while eliminating all "competing elite pyramids" [12] may vary. The ethnic factor can either facilitate elite consolidation (as in the 1990s) or hinder it (as recently seen in some republics). The main common feature of "super-loyal" regions, however, is a consolidated regional elite with a dominant actor who controls key political institutions and economic resources, distributes them among elite factions, and thereby ensures their loyalty and teamwork.

Question 3. Do cultural, ethnic, and religious factors influence "super-loyalty"?

Vitalii S. Kovin

Not directly, no. Not unless cultural, ethnic, or religious institutions are actively mobilized for voter turnout.

Nikolai I. Vorobyov

So-called "super-loyal" voting patterns are, in my view, explained by multiple factors. The ethnic factor, however, does not appear to play a decisive role in this phenomenon.

Yurii G. Korgunyuk

Only indirectly, as in when said factors are connected to that very political culture of kinship-based social networks discussed in the first answer. In this context, culture, ethnicity and religion function not as causal factors but as "markers" helping trace the operation of kinship networks.

Valentin V. Mikhailov

Yes, they do. But it is a secondary influence. During Tatarstan's sovereignty movement, some Tatars were motivated by ethnic solidarity with the republic's leadership. Post-1995, when district-level turnout and pro-government voting exceeded 90%, what took the stage was habitual obedience, where kolkhoz chairs wielded absolute local authority. I would argue this submissiveness and lack of rights-assertion skills constitute a cultural element.

Stanislav N. Shkel

Cultural, ethnic, and religious factors are politically neutral and don't produce "super-loyalty" directly. They may "enable loyalty" when utilized by political elites. That said, the elites may deploy them for either loyalist or protest mobilization. This is why the root cause of "super-loyalty" lies not in ethnic culture itself, but in strategies of the elites and how they frame ethnic issues for political utility.

Konstantin V. Kiselyov

One can argue there exists only indirect/mediated influence of ethnic and religious factors associated with clan-based and church mobilization mechanisms, rural settlement patterns, "linguistic mobilization" mechanisms, etc.

As for cultural factors, relevant elements include everyday traditionalism, shared traditions of loyalty, level of education, etc. The lower the level of social capital development (Bourdieu, Putnam et al.) is, the higher "super-loyalty" manifestations are.

Pyotr V. Panov

I believe neither a region's republican status nor ethnicity per se can be considered direct causes of "super-loyal" voting. This is clearly illustrated by empirical evidence, including that presented in the editorial preface. There is indeed correlation between republican status and superloyal voting, as well as between the proportion of ethnic minorities and superloyal voting, but as is well known, this is by no means evidence of cause-and-effect.

Question 4. Do social factors influence "super-loyalty"?

Konstantin V. Kiselyov

Absolutely. Income and education levels, economic dependency/mobility, strength of social ties, and trust/distrust patterns all clearly influence it.

Valentin V. Mikhailov

They may have some influence, but these are third-order contributing factors. Take Tatarstan's immediate neighbors: Kirov and Ulyanovsk oblasts, the republics of Chuvashia and Udmurtia. Living standards there were somewhat lower throughout the post-Soviet period, yet these regions indicated no significant electoral anomalies.

Yurii G. Korgunyuk

The influence is largely indirect. For instance, widespread poverty and dependence on state support facilitate vote returns manipulation. Yet they only do so when there is an established "falsification vertical". During the 1990s, in the regions lacking such systems, these populations either ignored elections or even voted against authorities (especially federal ones). An established vertical enables filling the "vacuum" with falsified results just as much as it does coercing state-dependent groups (particularly public sector workers) to vote.

Vitalii S. Kovin

Without question, there are social groups are more or less electorally active, more or less loyal to authorities, and more or less susceptible to administrative mobilization. Yet I would say that the key social factor behind "super-loyalty" is the indifference, the apathy of most voters toward both administrative coercion to participate and to the distortion of their expressed will. Administrative and financial dependence on superiors, threats of losing jobs or educational opportunities force even the few who protest to comply. Fear of authority, broadly understood, also constitutes a significant social factor. Producing "super-results" through administrative leverage and outright fraud requires involving numerous actors (officials, election commission members, security personnel, supervisors etc.). The normalization of deviant electoral culture and electoral corruption within regional communities (where everyone knows how "super-results" are achieved) represents the most critical social factor.

Stanislav N. Shkel

The central argument of Natalia Forrat's excellent book [6] is that social structure of regional communities primarily explains varying effectiveness of "political machines" across Russia's regions. Social divides and dominant public attitudes toward the state create differing opportunities and constraints for elites building these machines. I find Forrat's empirical evidence for this thesis quite convincing, and thus am positive that social factors are crucial for reproducing "super-loyalty". In my own book [25], I likewise provide evidence of how the social structure of a regional community may either facilitate or hinder the reproduction of "super-loyalty". For instance, Chuvashia's high interregional labor migration levels serve as a significant obstacle to local administrations' electoral control over the population. Conversely, Kemerovo Oblast's social conditions proved favourable for developing a powerful political machine that proved to be effective without any ethnic factor [6].

Nikolai I. Vorobyov

The key factors behind highly "super-loyal" voting patterns primarily lie in the behavior and personal motives of those involved in the electoral process in various capacities. This includes voters themselves, who fundamentally misunderstand their role and responsibility in democratic processes, the proper nature of their loyalty to public officials and their actual agency in shaping government bodies. Their attitude adds up to: "What difference does it make? Nothing changes anyway, my vote doesn't matter, so I'll just vote as dictated, ordered, asked, etc.". Such voter behavior stems from deficient education levels, underdeveloped political and legal culture among the population, including state and municipal officials.

And, of course, the current electoral organizers predominantly represented by state-funded employees (teachers, doctors, municipal staff etc.) play a prominent part in manufacturing "super-loyalty" within the existing political system. It is these individuals who orchestrate ballot-stuffing and falsifications for modest financial handouts, and thus in a peculiar manner "exploit" the population's poverty within the voter-organizer relations. It is the election commission members at all levels who produce favorable electoral reports, serving both the government's interests and their own.

Pyotr V. Panov

Every voter "lives" within a social context that is described and analyzed by sociology (or rather, by one of its branches) through the "social networks" concept. These networks vary significantly, including their density (the ratio of actual connections to possible connections [29]), so the denser the network, the more an individual depends on his or her social environment. In the case of elections, this means that the voter is more easily persuaded to vote "the right way" and it is easier to monitor how he or she votes. As a result, the effectiveness of political machines largely depends on whether they can: a) accurately identify (find, detect) dense social networks, and b) put them at their "service". Political technologists (who are, incidentally, practitioners) understand this well, while academic studies of political machines describe it through the "broker" concept.

Network density obviously depends on the size and type of settlement. In small rural communities, density becomes extremely high through multiple coexistent social ties: neighbors, coworkers, relatives, schoolmates (often having attended the only local school), etc. Simply put, more shared connections equals denser networks. This brings us to the role of ethnicity, as shared ethnic identity constitutes another form of "commonality" that can increase network connections. In my view, this matters specifically for ethnic minorities, though not at all due to any sociocultural peculiarities (some special "mentality"). The reason is purely sociological: as minorities, ethnic groups are inherently more vulnerable than dominant groups, particularly regarding language protection and, more broadly, cultural survival. At the same time, shared culture, even if it is just speaking a native language, creates additional connections and (at least potentially) increases network density. I'd like to emphasize again that this stems from the "disposition" (dominant vs. minority) of ethnic groups, not sociocultural peculiarities.

As a result, dense ethnic networks provide favorable conditions for political machine efficiency, and thus for "super-loyal" voting. This, I believe, explains why all studies show ethnic minority share has a positive influcence on voting for the party of power / its candidates.

In the late 2010s, my colleagues and I conducted deliberate research on this topic. Our quantitative study of municipal-level data (over 2,000 units) revealed that ethnic minority concentration in small rural settlements has an exceptionally strong effect on voting for the party of power. This combination dramatically increases communication density within social networks. While the ethnicity effect is markedly weaker in urban areas, even there it remains statistically significant (and this finding was somewhat unexpected) [21]. Our field research in Ulyanovsk and Penza oblasts that was conducted across multiple municipalities with ethnic minorities in various settlement types allowed us to understand how political machines operate within dense ethnic networks. The mechanisms are remarkably diverse, but the key lies in identifying an effective broker — an individual who has a solid reputation within the community. It might be a local administrator, but more often it is a businessman, school principal, ethnic NGO leader, clergy member, etc. Most importantly, in my opinion, our research revealed that in communities with dense ethnic networks, material rewards aren't the primary driver of "right voting". Political machines are operated largely by means of voluntary subordination of community members to their leaders. In other words, ordinary voters often support the government without direct material incentives [3].

Question 5. Do the relationships within regional and local elites affect "super-loyalty" manifestations?

Valentin V. Mikhailov

This may indeed be the case when a region contains multiple ethnic groups whose influence hasn't been suppressed by authoritarian governance.

Konstantin V. Kiselyov

The higher the degree of political and economic elite unity, the greater the level of loyalty. Conversely, splits, divisions and conflicts within the elites reduce the capacity for electoral mobilization and increase political competition.

Vitalii S. Kovin

They do. Achieving "super-results" depends entirely on the regional government's ability to control its territory and coordinate efforts with federal agencies (especially security) and local business structures. Severe inter-elite disagreements risk dropping turnout in contested areas and can disrupt political machine operations. High governability and absence of severe disagreements between elites may predispose a region to be selected as "super-loyal".

Yurii G. Korgunyuk

I believe it does, and significantly at that, primarily because conflicts between elite groups hinder the establishment of a unified "falsification vertical". In the case when a certain consensus is achieved between groups, and especially when hierarchical relations are established, this "falsification vertical" can be created relatively quickly and operates quite smoothly.

Stanislav N. Shkel

Yes, they absolutely do. Moreover, as I noted earlier, I consider regional elite structures and inter-elite dynamics to be the primary factors in reproducing "super-loyalty". A crucial condition for elite consolidation is the regional leader establishing control over local elites. In practice, this is achieved by replacing direct elections of local government heads with direct or indirect appointments by regional authorities. As researchers have long observed (see, for example, [19]), the effectiveness of political machines in ethnic republics largely relied on this practice of municipal heads being directly appointed by regional heads. Conversely, regions with established practices of direct popular elections for city mayors and municipal heads did not develop any powerful political machines.

Nikolai I. Vorobyov

In today's regions (and frankly, the entire country), there are no political alternatives: neither party nor individual. To quote Vladimir Vysotsky, "there are few true rebels", if any at all.

Question 6. Does the relationship between the head of the region and the central government influence "super-loyatly"?

Yurii G. Korgunyuk

Two decades ago, this was a relevant question. Today, the ability to deliver required voting outcomes essentially constitutes part of governors' KPIs, the governors being de facto federal appointees. Exceptions exist, of course, in those extremely rare cases where governors were elected against the central government's will. In such situations, "super-loyalty" is indeed out of the question.

Konstantin V. Kiselyov

This appears to be an indirect factor. The reality seems quite different. That is, delivering "super-loyalty" in elections serves as a prerequisite for maintaining the central government's favor toward a regional leader.

Stanislav N. Shkel

I suppose that the central government is interested in getting "super-loyalty" manifestations from all regions, just as much as a head of region considers reproducing electoral "super-loyalty" as a Kremlin-targeted demonstration of their control and effective governance capabilities. In return, the head of region expects that the central government will extended their tenure and let them keep their position of power. At the same time, the head enjoys considerable autonomy from the Kremlin when it comes to how "super-loyalty" metrics are achieved. Delivering these metrics falls within their zone of personal political responsibility and serves as the test of the head's effectiveness. In this sense, the relationship between the head and the central government barely has any influence over "super-loyalty".

Vitalii S. Kovin

The central government is a complex structure. Few regional leaders can boast close personal ties with the President, but for those who do (like Kadyrov), delivering "super-results" may serve as a public display of personal loyalty or reciprocation for privileges granted by the central government. Most governors orient themselves toward Putin's inner circle or Presidential Executive Office. Hypothetically, "super-loyalty" displays by a head of regions can be either voluntary or forced. Regardless, their motivation to deliver "super-results" directly relates to personal survival strategies within the current political system. What exact survival strategy the head employs during a specific election campaign remains an unobservable variable, discernible only after the fact, if at all.

Valentin V. Mikhailov

No doubt about it. A lot depends on the head's personality, their loyalty to the central government. This is one of the most important factors. Let's compare Bashkortostan and Tatarstan. They stand out thanks to very high results in the presidential elections held in 2004–2024. Still, there is a difference in the dynamics. Let's compare the two.

Under Rakhimov, Bashkortostan delivered more votes for Russian presidential candidates than Tatarstan, both in absolute and relative terms. However, the arrival of Khamitov saw these numbers decline (though remaining above the national average). Bashkortostan, which has a larger number of voters, began to bring the ruling party significantly fewer votes than its neighbour, the Republic of Tatarstan.

Nikolai I. Vorobyov

Acting governors (heads of federal subjects) play a crucial role in ensuring high levels of "super-loyalty" in voting. Under current conditions, they are completely dependent on the head of state and the bureaucratic elite. Through available "levers" and mechanisms, they not only mobilize the population to vote but also enforce unconditional support for current administration. This involves employing various approaches ranging from the so-called "stick" to "carrot".

Question 7. What role does vote-buying, coercion of voters, violation of secrecy of vote and direct fraud play in ensuring "super-loyalty"?

Yurii G. Korgunyuk

These are elements of "falsification vertical" operating system and, one could even say, its key tools.

Valentin V. Mikhailov

There is no "super-loyalty" without the listed methods. In my estimation, their role accounts for 70-80%.

Konstantin V. Kiselyov

All the methods listed are one of, if not the most important, mechanisms for ensuring super-loyalty.

Nikolai I. Vorobyov

I believe that a significant portion of this "super-loyal" voting is ensured through simple ballot stuffing and fraud, for which there are many examples and public evidence.

Vitalii S. Kovin

Each of the "super-results" is a combination of three key factors: voter turnout and loyalty, the effectiveness of administrative mobilization, direct fraud. However, the actual voter turnout and loyalty in "super-loyal" regions during nationwide elections hardly differ from other regions, as repeatedly demonstrated by independent observation and/or video surveillance conducted across a set of polling stations. Achieving "super-results" is more dependent on two other factors. It appears that the effectiveness of political mobilization in favor of pro-government candidates and turnout increase (through various means, such as information campaigns, agitator networks, activism of supporters and proxies, media campaigns, and tactics by political strategists and campaign teams) remains roughly the same. Outright failures or breakthroughs are rare, as a rule.

Stanislav N. Shkel

These practices are difficult to measure, and therefore I have no specific answer to this question. I can only note that, according to the research data I collected through interviews and focus groups, direct vote-buying, coercion, and violations of ballot secrecy are not widespread practices. Instead, local authorities employ softer mobilization techniques, such as persuasion, campaigning, and personal appeals to participate in elections. Voters tend to respond positively to such appeals out of solidarity and a reluctance to damage relationships with superiors and colleagues. In other words, regional and local authorities leverage administrative resources, but not in the form of repression, intimidation, or bribery. Rather, these resources are deployed locally through requests from individuals close to the voters — people with whom they have direct work or neighborhood ties. As a result, voters do not perceive such appeals as pressure, and they are generally received favorably. I would therefore argue that a significant role in sustaining "super-loyalty" is played not by direct electoral corruption, but by local authorities utilizing pre-existing social networks by relying not on threats, but on appeals to solidarity, communal norms, and collective well-being. If these practices prove insufficient to achieve the desired electoral outcome, falsification may be employed.

Pyotr V. Panov

In my view, "super-loyalty" is primarily explained by the effective activity of political machines — political organizations which mobilize voters aimed at maximizing the vote (number of votes) for the party/candidate they work for.

The phenomenon of political machines has been well studied across a variety of countries, beginning with the United States [2: 115]. The studies show that the activities of political machines are by no means limited to buying votes or providing material benefits to voter groups in exchange for "right" voting. The range of technologies employed by political machines is much broader, including various instruments of both persuasion and coercion. And the better political machines perform (i.e., the more precisely they set priorities, the more competently they allocate resources, the more skillfully they employ technologies, etc.), the higher the electoral results of their "employer" will be.

Question 8. Do regions exhibiting "super-loyalty" differ in their methods of achieving it?

Yurii G. Korgunyuk

Most certainly. In some regions, it is necessary to "mobilize" employees at production facilities or various organizations, while in others, directing election commissions to meet required numbers is enough.

Valentin V. Mikhailov

There is reason to believe that as falsifications spread to an increasing number of regions, there is also a transfer of ‘experience’ from one constituent entity of the Russian Federation to another. At the same time, it is clear that in practice, the methods cannot be identical.

Konstantin V. Kiselyov

The differences in ensuring "super-loyalty" appear largely insignificant. Administrative and economic coercion, direct and indirect vote-buying (quizzes, lotteries, etc.), outright falsifications, bans on opposition campaigning, suppression of civic activism, ensuring total loyalty of press and online influence agents, etc.

Vitalii S. Kovin

Naturally, there are baseline social differences between regions (share of urban voters, voters with higher education, level of opposition support, etc.) that must be accounted for and compensated for through specialized political technologies. However, it appears that the decisive contribution to achieving "super-results" comes from administrative mobilization and direct falsification of results. The distinction between "super-loyal" regions and specific electoral campaigns lies solely in the ratio between these methods. Both "technologies" represent approaches to implementing regional electoral policy and regional electoral management. The effectiveness of managing this regional electoral engineering depends, among other factors, on the depth and scope of administrative penetration down to the individual voter and member of the precinct election commission. Moreover, the ability to safely falsify results and employ methods of electoral corruption [13] renders large-scale administrative voter mobilization irrelevant (why bother when you can simply fabricate the result) and vice versa.

Stanislav N. Shkel

I believe it is not inappropriate to once again reference Natalia Forrat’s outstanding book [6], where she makes a brilliant demonstration of how differently political machines operate in regions with varying social structures. The dominance of pro-state (statist) social norms makes it easier for authorities to build effective political machines based on principles of solidarity and collective participation. In regions with more pluralistic social structures and numerous autonomous social groups, authorities find it simpler to employ practices of direct bribery or co-option of these groups’ leaders. As noted in the book, both models of machine politics can successfully produce "super-loyalty," but the first option proves more reliable, functioning consistently even in times of crisis.

Pyotr V. Panov

Dense social networks, including ethnic ones, are simply favorable conditions for political machines to operate. Machines are constructed, formed, assembled, and ultimately operated by people, and those are not always competent, motivated, or even hardworking. This is especially true for political machines, which are inherently complex "constructions" requiring skilled management. As a result, even favorable conditions never bring guaranteed success. I believe this explains why, in seemingly similar social contexts, "super-loyal" voting emerges in one case and not in the other. The cases of Mari El and Mordovia are particularly illustrative in this regard. Besides, social network density is not the sole favorable condition for super-loyal voting. There are clearly other conditions, which make an in-depth study of Kuzbass particularly promising, since it might be the most "super-loyal" among Russia's "ethnic Russian" regions.

Question 9. What explains the observable changes in the list of "super-loyal" regions?

Valentin V. Mikhailov

Before all else, it is changes in regional leadership.

Konstantin V. Kiselyov

Change-driving factors include: rotation of regional and sub-regional authorities, coincidence of elections at different levels, shifts in the region's dominant economic actors (less competition — more loyalty; heightened competition — declining loyalty), inter-elite conflict dynamics (conflict — decreased loyal voting), etc.

Vitalii S. Kovin

There exist, for a lack of a better word, "base" regions that are prepared to demonstrate their "super-loyalty": they appear on the list after nearly every election, but their contribution alone is insufficient to meet the target set by the central government. Additional regions are then identified to make up the deficit and reach the required metrics. Presumably, the selection of such regions is determined situationally based on an assessment of capabilities of the incumbent regional administration. The pool of these "chosen" regions is broader than those that are ultimately categorized as "super-loyal". The goal is not to outperform others, but to meet the set target figures, and achieving "super-results" is just a bonus.

Yurii G. Korgunyuk

I believe these changes primarily relate to the need to activate the "falsification vertical". At best, regular loyalty can be achieved without it. "Super-loyalty" needs this machine.

That said, operating the "falsification vertical" in most regions demands serious exertion, and a "super-loyal" result is not always always necessary — sometimes a simple "loyal" result is enough. Therefore, for instance, if "super-loyalty" is a guarantee that a region will secure a State Duma seat, the machine will operate at full capacity; if it is not, it runs "at half steam".

Stanislav N. Shkel

I believe these changes primarily relate to structural transformations among regional elites. When elite consolidation persists, the reproduction of "super-loyalty" remains stable, whereas structural fragmentation of elites reduces the effectiveness of political machines. The causes behind shifts in elite networks may vary, but recently in Russia they have been tied chiefly to the Kremlin-led rotation of regional governors. Seeking to reduce regional autonomy, the central government imposes its own appointees who often become "outsiders" ("Varangians") incapable of establishing constructive relationships with local elites. As a result, interactions between the new head and regional elites arise out of conflict. Large-scale rotation of regional and local elites, which typically accompanies the arrival of a new governor (the "Varangian"), only intensifies tensions and fuels fragmentation of elites. The result is declining electoral "super-loyalty." These were exactly the processes we could observe in the Republic of Bashkortostan after Murtaza Rakhimov resigned as head of the republic in 2010 [26] or in the Republic of Komi following Governor Vyacheslav Gaizer's dismissal in 2015 [14].

Question 10. Are there scientific approaches that can help isolate the role of different methods in achieving "super-loyalty"?

Valentin V. Mikhailov

In the absence of reliable sociological foundations, we must rely on mathematical statisticians and their diverse approaches to this problem.

Yurii G. Korgunyuk

Pure falsifications are the easiest to track. In this case, Sergei Shpilkin's methodology would work quite well. All other methods for achieving "super-loyalty" can only be identified through indirect signs, and what we have here are not so much reliable methods as more or less substantiated hypotheses.

Nikolai I. Vorobyov

So-called "super-loyal" voting is just an assessment of the "returns" of conducted elections, not the electoral campaign or voting process itself. Therefore, scientific approaches should focus not on "super-loyalty" per se, but on electoral and political practices, the actual methods and techniques applied in electoral campaigns, elections, and voting procedures.

Stanislav N. Shkel

These days, researchers of electoral processes are only taking their first steps to understand not just the general logic and universal mechanisms behind electoral "super-loyalty," but also to identify the specific methods and models of this political phenomenon. I believe Natalia Forrat's book [6] is groundbreaking in this regard. It represents one of the first attempts to identify different types of machine politics, distinguishing between "team" political machines in statist societies and "clientelistic" ones in antistatist societies. However, this issue still contains many research gaps to be filled by further scholarly investigation.

Vitalii S. Kovin

Current methods of electoral statistics, based on detecting anomalous fluctuations in official results, are sufficiently effective at identifying the presence and contribution of direct falsifications to achieving "super-loyalty". Isolating the role of administrative mobilization requires qualitative analysis of voter composition at individual polling stations and constituencies combined with field observation. The suggested approaches are time- and labour-consuming, however, and require significant effort to establish links between precinct election commissions (PECs) and specific enterprises, educational institutions, and other organizations. Some information about mechanisms and tools of electoral management and electoral corruption can be extracted from analyzing materials of rare court cases involving election law violations and financial offenses. I would say that "super-loyal results" should be fundamentally viewed not as a reflection of voters' genuine political preferences, of their actual loyalty levels or engagement, but rather as indicators of the region's loyalty to the central government and the degree of control exercised by regional political elites.

Konstantin V. Kiselyov

There indeed are. These methods are no different from those used in other electoral contexts, such as measuring turnout, ratings, electability, etc. However, there are several nuances to consider.

First, quantitative methods are becoming less effective. It has come to the point where maintaining proper sample proportions is often difficult, as people of certain social statuses and political positions either refuse to answer or bluff it out when they do answer.

Second, even when conducting quantitative studies, researchers increasingly need to "decipher" the true position of a respondent. Our research group has for years used audio-recording tablets during surveys, enabling us to identify stable speech patterns, recurring lexemes and other similar markers. Frequently, the linguistic material obtained this way yields more accurate conclusions than numerical analysis.

Third, qualitative sociology also faces challenges of participants being "guarded," yet it is still capable of drawing conclusions about the foundations of loyalism or opposition.

Fourth, observational methods practiced by scholars like Simon Kordonsky appear sufficiently capable of recognizing loyalty factors.

Finally, it is crucial that post-electoral research is conducted, which has always been scarce due to lack of demand. Why spend any more money if we got the results? In our group's entire electoral research history, we found only one client for post-electoral measurements.

Received 02.04.2025, revision received 06.04.2025.

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