Elections in Moldova: Residents vs. Diaspora

Lyubarev A.E.

Abstract

The paper analyses diaspora voting in presidential and parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova between 2014 and 2025. It shows that, throughout this period, voting at polling stations abroad differed substantially from voting within the republic. In Moldova itself, the results of pro-Russian and pro-European camps were relatively close, whereas pro-European camp dominated among diaspora voters. In the 2024 presidential election, the 2024 constitutional referendum, and the 2025 parliamentary elections, diaspora voting played a decisive role in the victory of pro-European camp. At the same time, voting results differ considerably across countries: in Russia, Moldovan voters mainly support pro-Russian camp; in most European countries, the United States, and Canada, they support pro-European camp; while some Asian countries (Turkey, Israel, etc.) as well as Belarus and Bulgaria, take an intermediate position. In Europe, the United States, and Canada, both the size of the Moldovan diaspora and the number of voters participating in Moldovan elections are increasing, and the number of polling stations established in these countries is rising accordingly. In Russia, the number of polling stations grew until 2020 and was then reduced, which was an obviously discriminatory decision. At the same time, the analysis shows that, despite the large number of Moldovan citizens residing in Russia, the number of voters there has never been high and could not have had a decisive impact, except in the case of the 2024 constitutional referendum. The paper discusses the broader problem of diaspora voting and concludes that specific standards need to be developed for campaigning and voting in the diaspora, as well as specific monitoring systems and methods.

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The 2024 presidential election in the Republic of Moldova and the 2025 parliamentary elections that followed raised the question of the diaspora’s role in election results. Experts and politicians drew attention to a number of facts. First, vote returns within the republic differed substantially from the overall returns of diaspora voting. Second, diaspora voting itself displayed marked differences: diasporas in Europe and America voted almost exclusively for pro-European parties and their leaders, whereas the diaspora in Russia voted for pro-Russian parties and candidates. Third, by decision of Moldova’s CEC, the number of polling stations in European countries and America was significantly increased, while the number of polling stations in Russia was reduced.

This gave rise to the view that decisions concerning the number of polling stations were taken in order to increase electoral support for pro-European political camp and may have affected the election results – that is, they may have secured the victory of the incumbent, Maia Sandu, in the presidential election and of her Party of Action and Solidarity in the parliamentary elections [2; 7; 10; 12; 14; 31].

To clarify this issue, we decided to analyse vote returns over a broad period – from 2014 to 2025. During this time, there were four parliamentary election campaigns (2014, 2019, the early elections of 2021, and 2025) and three presidential election campaigns (2016, 2020, and 2024, all of which went to a second round). In addition, in 2024, a referendum on Moldova’s accession to the European Union was held simultaneously with the first round of the presidential election. This gives a total of 11 votes. All data on voting results are taken from the official website of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova [39].

It is important to bear in mind that in 2014–2019 the parliamentary majority was held by pro-European parties usually regarded as oligarchic, and the government was accordingly headed by their representatives, while the president during this period was elected by parliament. In 2016–2020, the president was Igor Dodon, the leader of the pro-Russian political camp, although the powers of the Moldovan president are highly limited. In 2019–2021, there was no stable majority in parliament, which gave the pro-Russian president certain opportunities to exert influence. Since 2020, the president has been Maia Sandu, the leader of the pro-European political camp, and since 2021 her party has also held a parliamentary majority [8; 11; 34].

We seek to answer the following questions:

· did diaspora voting play a decisive role in any elections or referendum in Moldova during the period under study?

· were the decisions to increase the number of polling stations in Europe and America and to reduce their number in Russia justified?

· did these decisions affect the election results?

Diaspora and Resident Voting

First, let us compare voting within the republic with diaspora voting as a whole, both in terms of the number of voters who cast ballots and in terms of vote returns. For clarity, we divide most parties and candidates into two main groups: pro-European and pro-Russian. These groups exclude a small number of parties and candidates, mainly fringe parties and candidates.

This division is well established in studies of the party-political configuration of contemporary Moldova. Scholars note the strong polarisation of the republic’s politicians and electorate and their division into two camps. At the same time, there is fairly intense competition within each camp, which makes coalition-building difficult. In addition, spoiler parties operate in each camp and are assumed to be supported by leaders from the opposing camp [34].

Table 1 presents the division of parties, blocs, and candidates in the 2014–2025 elections. With regard to the pro-European camp, it should be noted that until 2019 the Democratic Party of Moldova, the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova, and the Liberal Party formed the governing alliance, which was regarded as centrist and close to the oligarchs; Action and Solidarity is a right-wing party that became the governing party in 2020–2021; while the Alternative bloc was perceived as centre-left [8; 14; 18; 19; 34].

All pro-Russian parties are considered left-wing. However, it has been noted that on a number of issues they are closer to European illiberal parties, including right-wing populist ones. The electorate of these parties displays strong nostalgia for the Soviet period [17; 19]. At the same time, it is argued that these parties primarily unite supporters of the preservation of distinct Moldovan identity (Moldovenists), although it is also acknowledged that they are, "to a certain extent, characterised by Russophile and pro-Russian sentiments" [10; 31].

Table 2 compares vote returns within the country and abroad in elections and the referendum held between 2014 and 2025. We can see that the number of voters casting ballots within the republic tended to decline during the 2010s. If parliamentary and presidential elections are considered separately, the lowest number of voters in parliamentary elections was recorded in the early elections of 2021; however, fewer voters also took part in 2025 than in 2014 and 2019. In presidential elections, the lowest number of voters was recorded in the first round in 2020. In the first round in 2024, more voters cast ballots than in 2020, but fewer than in 2016. In the second round of the presidential election, turnout was higher than in the first round in all three campaigns: by 7% in 2016, 14% in 2020, and 4% in 2024.

By contrast, the number of voters casting ballots abroad increased from 2016 onwards (if second-round voting in presidential elections is excluded). If the share of voters abroad is calculated as a proportion of the total number of voters, it increased steadily throughout the period under study. In the second round of presidential elections, turnout also increased compared with the first round, but to a much greater extent than within the republic: 2.1 times in 2016, 1.8 times in 2020, and 1.4 times in 2024.

Voting for parties and candidates presents a clear picture. Within the republic, the results of pro-European and pro-Russian political camps were usually fairly close, although in some campaigns pro-Russian parties and candidates were well ahead of pro-European ones; the latest parliamentary elections were the exception. In the diaspora as a whole, however, pro-European parties and candidates dominated, ranging from a minimum of 62.6% in 2014 to a maximum of 92.6% in the second round in 2020.

Did diaspora voting play a decisive role in the election results? This question is easiest to answer with respect to presidential elections and the referendum. It is clear that in 2016 Dodon was elected president despite the diaspora vote. In 2020, Sandu managed to win not only among diaspora voters, but also within Moldova.

The success of the 2024 referendum on Moldova’s accession to the European Union, however, would have been impossible without the diaspora. Within the republic, only 44% of voters supported the proposal, while almost 53% voted against it, with around 3% invalid ballots, which is quite a high figure for Moldova. Within the country, the number of "no" votes exceeded the number of "yes" votes by 115,605, but abroad there were 126,169 more "yes" votes than "no" votes. As a result, "yes" outnumbered "no" by only 10,564 votes.

The same happened in the 2024 presidential election. Within the republic, Stoianoglo was ahead of Sandu by 36,126 votes in the second round, but among diaspora voters he lost to her by 215,835 votes. As a result, Sandu finished 179,709 votes ahead of her opponent and won with 54.7%.

In the 2025 parliamentary elections, the Party of Action and Solidarity, founded by Sandu, received 49.2% of the total number of voters, 50.2% of valid ballots, and 53.3% of the total votes cast for the parties included in seat allocation. It thus won more than half of the seats. Within the republic, however, its result was more modest: 43.2% of the total number of voters, or 47.1% of the total votes cast for the parties included in seat allocation. Without the diaspora vote, therefore, the Party of Action and Solidarity would probably have had to enter into a coalition.

In 2021, the party’s position was stronger. Although within the republic it received only 46.75% of the total number of voters, its share of the total votes cast for the parties included in seat allocation – the only figure that matters for the allocation of seats – was 55.4%. In other words, even without the diaspora vote, it would have gotten more than half of the seats.

The Diversity of the Diaspora

Diaspora voting appears fairly consolidated. In reality, however, there are substantial differences in voting across countries. The countries where polling stations are established for Moldovan elections can be divided into three groups according to their location, voting results, and several other features:

· European Union countries (Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Finland, France, Croatia, Czechia, Sweden, Estonia), plus Monaco and Switzerland (yet we are not considering Romania and Bulgaria as part of this group;

· Anglophone countries, conventionally understood here to include the United Kingdom (since it has left the European Union), as well as the United States and Canada;

· Asian countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, India, Kazakhstan, Qatar, China, the UAE, Turkey, Japan), with Israel and Turkey accounting for the largest numbers of voters.

Five countries stand apart: Romania, which will be considered separately because of its geographical proximity, language ties, and shared history; Bulgaria, whose voting results differ markedly from those of other European countries; Belarus; Ukraine; and Russia. Russia, like Romania, will be considered separately as the fourth and fifth "groups". Bulgaria, Belarus, and Ukraine will not be analysed separately because of the small number of voters there. In terms of vote returns, they could have been grouped with the Asian countries, although this would be geographically inappropriate.

Table 3 shows the vote returns for pro-European political parties and candidates in these five groups over the entire period under study. In calculating these results, on the basis of the data provided by the CEC of Moldova, we had to exclude votes cast for candidates who received only a small share of the diaspora vote: Ghiletchi and Ghimpu in 2016, Deliu and Chirtoaca in 2020, and Nastase and Ticu in 2024.

We can see that support for pro-European parties and candidates was high in EU countries in all cases. In the Anglophone countries, it was always even higher than in the EU countries, and in Romania it was higher still than in the Anglophone countries (with one exception). In the Asian countries, support for pro-European parties and candidates never rose above 80%, and in roughly half of the cases it was below 50%. In Russia, by contrast, support for pro-European camp exceeded 20% only twice, in the second round in 2020 and in 2021, and never reached even 30%.

These results are easily explained by factors of both interest and ideology. On the one hand, Moldovans living in Europe tend to see Moldova's closer ties with Europe as serving their interests, while those living in Russia tend to see closer ties with Russia in similar terms. On the other hand, those who left Moldova to work in Europe are generally oriented towards European values, whereas those who left for Russia are oriented towards Soviet ones.

Polling stations and voters abroad

The next issue concerns the number of polling stations abroad. Table 4 shows how the number of polling stations changed across different groups of countries, alongside the number of voters who cast ballots and the ratio between the two. The number of polling stations in the European Union, the Anglophone countries, and Romania increased steadily, with no changes only in 2016. Over the period under study, the number rose 3.6 times in the European Union, 4.6 times in the Anglophone countries, and 2.1 times in Romania. The sharpest increase in the European Union and the Anglophone countries came in 2024: 2.0 times and 1.5 times respectively. In Romania, the larger increase occurred in 2025, at 1.4 times.

In Asia, the increase was not continuous: the number of polling stations grew in 2016 and 2019, declined in 2020, and then grew again in 2024 and 2025. This expansion, however, was mainly due to polling stations being opened in additional countries. Most countries always had one polling station; Israel always had two; Turkey had three in 2016 and 2019, but returned to two in 2020; and in 2025 the UAE and Japan also had two polling stations each. Overall, during the period under study, the number of polling stations in Asia increased 1.9 times.

Russia is the exception to this pattern. The number of polling stations there increased in 2016, 2019, and 2020, rising 3.4 times over this period (from 5 to 17). In 2024, however, it was sharply reduced to two, both of them in Moscow. As a result, Moldovan citizens living in Russia far from the capital lost the opportunity to vote. The reasons for this decision will be discussed in one of the following sections.

Everywhere except Russia, the number of voters shows an upward trend (second-round voting should be considered separately from other votes, since turnout everywhere rises sharply compared with the first round). A comparison of the number of voters in 2025 and 2014 gives a ratio of 4.5 for the European Union, 6.7 for the Anglophone countries, 2.8 for Romania, and 2.4 for Asia. In other words, in all four groups, the growth in the number of voters outpaced the growth in the number of polling stations. Russia is the only case where we see a decline, with a ratio of 0.4.

Is the increase in the number of polling stations connected with the increase in the number of voters? For the European Union, the Anglophone countries, and Romania, the correlations are fairly high, at 0.78–0.84. But what is the cause, and what is the effect?

It should be noted here that the most substantial increase in voter numbers occurred in 2020 compared with 2019: 2.1 times in the European Union, 2.3 times in the Anglophone countries, 1.6 times in Romania, and 1.4 times in Asia. Russia also saw growth at that point, but on a smaller scale, at 1.2 times, while in 2024 the increase compared with 2021 was 1.3 times. Taken together, these figures suggest that the growth in voter numbers was driven less by the increase in polling stations than by other factors (campaigning and voter mobilisation). The same conclusion is supported by the average number of voters per polling station, which rarely exceeded 2,000 even in the second round, except in Russia in 2024.

Voting in Russia

As shown above, there were five polling stations in Russia in 2014, eight in 2016, eleven in 2019, seventeen in 2020 and 2021, and two in 2024 and 2025.

In 2014, there were two polling stations in Moscow and one each in St. Petersburg, Sochi, and Novosibirsk. In 2016, there was no polling station in Novosibirsk, but new stations were opened in Krasnoyarsk, Kursk, and Nizhnevartovsk, along with an additional station in St. Petersburg. In 2019, the polling station in Novosibirsk was restored, and stations were added in Kaliningrad and Tula, bringing the total to nine cities. .

In 2020, the number of polling stations increased to seven in Moscow and three in St. Petersburg. The stations in Tula and Kursk remained; Surgut replaced Nizhnevartovsk; and Kostroma, Lipetsk, and Ryazan replaced Kaliningrad, Krasnoyarsk, and Novosibirsk, leaving the number of cities unchanged at nine.

In 2021, the number of polling stations remained unchanged, but the number of cities fell to four: Moscow and Moscow Oblast now had twelve stations, St. Petersburg retained three, Tula was the only other city to remain, and Kaluga was added. Finally, in 2024, only two polling stations remained, both in Moscow.

Table 5 shows the number of voters who cast ballots in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other cities. Moscow dominated in every case. Among the other cities, the largest numbers of voters were recorded in Sochi in 2014 and 2016 (570, 137, and 325), in Kursk in 2019 and in the first round of 2020 (298 and 209), in Tula in the second round of 2020 (411), and in Kaluga in 2021 (339).

The most useful examples for examining vote returns by city are the 2019 and 2020 elections, when polling stations were located in the largest number of Russian cities. These data are presented in Tables 6 and 7, which also include returns from several countries for comparison.

Table 6 presents data from the 2019 parliamentary elections, in which the main contestants were the pro-Russian PSRM, whose de facto leader was the then president Dodon, and the pro-European PDM and ACUM bloc. In Moldova itself, PSRM came first with 31.5%, while PDM and ACUM were roughly equal, at 24.0% and 23.6% respectively. In the diaspora, however, ACUM dominated with 70.7%, while PSRM received 8.3% and PDM only 6.7%. In Russia, by contrast, PSRM received 63.5%.

As Table 6 shows, PSRM led in most Russian cities with broadly similar vote shares, ranging from 57% to 75%. Its result was slightly higher in Kursk and markedly lower in Novosibirsk, where only 16 people voted. In Novosibirsk, the Șor Party also performed relatively well. Renato Usatii’s Our Party had some relative success in Moscow, Nizhnevartovsk, and Tula, although it received less than 3% both in Moldova and in the diaspora as a whole. Belarus and Turkey produced returns similar to those in Russia, whereas in other countries PSRM lost to pro-European parties and candidates.

The first-round vote returns in the 2020 presidential election are of particular interest (Table 7). While Dodon was the preferred candidate in eight Russian cities, and Sandu led in the European Union and America, Renato Usatii came first in Moscow (as well as in Israel). He also received fairly strong support in St. Petersburg, Sochi, Tula, Ryazan, and Surgut. Only Lipetsk, Kostroma, and Kursk gave Dodon consolidated support.

Russian cities were similarly divided in the second round. In Kostroma, Kursk, and Lipetsk, Dodon received more than 90%, while Sandu received less than 7%. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, by contrast, support for Dodon was below 80%, while support for Sandu exceeded 20%; Ryazan, Tula, and Sochi were not far behind the two capitals. Dodon also received somewhat lower support, at 59–65%, in Belarus, Bulgaria, and Turkiye. Europe and America, by contrast, voted in a highly consolidated manner: Sandu received more than 98% in the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, and Ireland.

How Many Voters are There In the Diaspora?

Data on the number of Moldovan citizens abroad are inconsistent and constantly changing. They are based both on figures from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI) and on information from civil society organisations. A 2014 publication noted that estimates of Moldovan labour migrants varied widely across sources – from 300,000 according to official statistics to 550,000–600,000 according to various international organisations. Official statistics for 2012 put the total at 328,300 people, including 223,400 in Russia, 54,900 in Italy, 7,900 in Israel, 5,800 in Turkey, 3,900 in Ukraine, 3,900 in Romania, 3,200 in Portugal, 2,100 in Greece, and 24,100 in other countries [13].

These figures do not inspire much confidence. This is clearest in the case of Romania, where 10,500 Moldovan voters cast ballots in 2014. The figures for Moldovans in Italy, Greece, and Portugal also appear to be understated.

Somewhat different figures were cited in 2017: "According to official data, between 340,000 and 1 million people work abroad… In the CIS, the main destination is Russia (Moscow and Moscow Oblast)… The largest concentrations of Moldovan labour migrants are found in Russia (58%), Italy (19%), and Portugal (5%)" [40].

The diaspora was later estimated to be even larger: "According to data from Moldova’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for 2021, between 1.11 and 1.25 million citizens of the Republic of Moldova lived outside the country". The diaspora in Italy was estimated at 250,000, while those in Germany and France were estimated at around 100,000 each. As for Russia, Moldova’s MFA estimated that around 350,000 Moldovans lived there, while official Russian data put the figure at 190,000 citizens [31]. A somewhat lower estimate is given in another study: the number of immigrants from Moldova stood at 745,900 in 2015, 812,700 in 2020, and 864,300 in 2024 [2].

Similar figures appeared in other Russian sources: "Even according to official data, which are clearly understated, the largest number of Moldovan citizens are in Russia – 477,949. There are also sizeable Moldovan diasporas in Italy – 142,266, the United States – 47,754, Canada – 17,565, Spain – 16,202, and Germany – 14,815" [8]. Another source stated that more than 400,000 Moldovan citizens lived in Russia [20]; a third gave a figure of 200,000 to 400,000 [12]; and a fourth put the number at more than 500,000 [7].

At the same time, a Promo-LEX report stated that Moldovans had left the Russian Federation in large numbers and that their number had fallen 3.5 times over two years, from 2022 to 2024. The same source also gave other figures that were somewhat at odds with those cited above: according to Foreign Ministry estimates, in 2024 the largest numbers of Moldovan citizens were in Italy (300,000), the Russian Federation (260,000), and France (160,000). Compared with 2020, the ministry recorded the largest increases in Italy (+171,000), France (+143,000), the United States (+80,000), and Germany (+71,000). Declines were recorded in the Russian Federation (-100,000) and Canada (-24,000) [28]. These figures imply that the number of Moldovans in Russia fell not 3.5 times, but only 1.4 times.

Overall, the number of Moldovan citizens abroad is generally reported to be growing steadily. The increase in the number of voters casting ballots abroad is therefore to be expected [2; 21].

A number of sources note the important role of the diaspora in Moldova’s economy. This mainly concerns remittances sent to relatives in Moldova by Moldovans working abroad: in 2011, these were estimated at 23% of GDP [13], and in 2017 at 33–37% of GDP [40]. Another source states that, in the third quarter of 2017, 36.5% of all remittances came from the CIS, primarily from Russia, 34.5% from the EU, and 29.9% from other countries [8].

More detailed data are provided by N.V.Bodishtyanu [2]. According to her data, remittances in dollar terms peaked in 2013, when USD 2.2 billion entered the country. In 2016, remittances fell to USD 1.5 billion, before increasing again to USD 2.0–2.1 billion in 2021–2023. As a share of Moldova’s GDP, they stood at 34.5% in 2006, but then declined, reaching 12.1% in 2023. The author also notes: "For a long time, it was common practice in the country to bring in cash from abroad without using money transfer systems. In other words, the de facto volume of diaspora funds in the economy is significantly higher than the figures that statistical agencies are able to track".

We can now compare estimates of the size of the diaspora with data on Moldovan voters abroad. Table 8 covers the 13 countries with the largest numbers of Moldovan citizens in 2024, according to Moldova’s MFA. It gives the number of Moldovan citizens in each country [28], alongside the number of voters in the first and second rounds of the 2024 presidential election and in the 2025 parliamentary elections. The final column gives "turnout" in 2025, calculated as the ratio of voters to citizens.

As we can see, the share of Moldovans who voted is extremely low in Russia, as well as in Ukraine and Poland. The figure is also relatively low in the United States and Israel. In seven countries, the share of voters ranged from 16% to 42%. The unusually high "turnout" in the United Kingdom casts doubt on the data on the number of Moldovan citizens living there (of course, one might also question the voter numbers, but such doubts would require stronger grounds).

For us, reasons for the low "turnout" in Russia are of greatest interest. There are clearly several such reasons, both natural and administrative. In 2024–2025, the ability of Russian Moldovans to vote was limited by three related administrative factors: only two polling stations were opened, both were located in Moscow, and, in the second round of the presidential election, the number of ballot papers was capped (Moldovan law allows no more than 5,000 ballot papers per polling station).

However, Table 4 shows that the highest number of Moldovans who voted in Russia was only 14,068, in the second round of the 2020 presidential election. At that time, MFAEI estimated the number of Moldovan citizens in Russia at 356,731, which gives a "turnout" of 4% – far lower than in Western European countries. At the tine, there were 17 polling stations in Russia: seven in Moscow, three in St. Petersburg, and another seven in seven cities from Sochi to Surgut.

Naturally, Russia is a vast country, and reaching the nearest polling station was difficult and costly for those living far away. However, sources indicate that Moldovans in Russia are concentrated mainly in Moscow, Moscow Oblast, and St. Petersburg [20; 40], and in 2020 a sufficient number of polling stations were opened for them. Even so, 10,614 people voted in Moscow, 1,877 in St Petersburg, and 1,578 in the other seven cities combined (see Table 5).

A more important factor, however, may be the strength of the diaspora’s connection to the Republic of Moldova. Existing studies suggest that this connection is stronger among the European diaspora than among Moldovans in Russia. It has been noted that 42% of migrants have children who remained in Moldova [40], although no breakdown by country is provided. At the same time, a representative of the diaspora in Russia acknowledged that most Moldovans who moved to Russia do not plan to return. He also noted that "the opportunity to vote in Moldova is important to them because they care about the fate of their homeland and of the relatives who remain there" [7]. It is easy to see, however, that only a small minority are likely to think in these terms.

Another factor may be the way pro-Russian and pro-European parties approach the diaspora. Previous studies have noted that pro-Russian parties either referred to citizens living abroad in negative terms or ignored them altogether, whereas the Liberal Party, and PAS to an even greater extent, made it their aim to protect the rights and interests of citizens of the Republic of Moldova abroad and to cooperate with them [2].

It has also been suggested that the diaspora living in Russia became disappointed with President Dodon, from whom they had expected more substantial changes in Moldova’s relations with Russia [21].

On the Number of Polling Stations

Moldova’s Electoral Code provides for five criteria to be used in establishing polling stations abroad. Until 2022, however, the Code did not set any order of priority among these criteria, which led to differing outcomes. The report by the Moldovan observation organisation Promo-LEX on the 2019 parliamentary elections noted that "the establishment of PSs abroad was non-transparent, and the institutions responsible for constitution proposals did not provide arguments for any of the 5 criteria stipulated in the Electoral Code" [24].

It was reported that Moldova’s president, Igor Dodon, was dissatisfied with the fact that only 11 polling stations had been established in Russia. The possibility of opening 100 or even 150 polling stations was discussed [20], which was clearly unrealistic.

There were also objections during the 2020 presidential election: "Despite the numerous requests of the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (CALC), note that CEC did not hold public, official and transparent consultations involving all stakeholders with regards to the draft decision establishing PSs abroad". The formula proposed by Promo-LEX was used as the basis for the calculation in the case of 21 states, while exceptions were made for 15 states, with a larger or smaller number of polling stations established. Nevertheless, the Promo-LEX report noted: "It is thus for the first time since Moldovan citizens can vote abroad that the body in charge of establishing PSs abroad described in detail the actions taken to set them up". Promo-LEX considered that the CEC should have proposed and adopted a decision to establish more polling stations in the United Kingdom (+2), the Russian Federation (+6), Canada (+1), Israel (+1), and Poland (+2).

The report also addressed the prior registration of citizens abroad. In 2019, 24,125 prior registration requests were recorded; by 16 September 2020, 60,035 registrations had been confirmed. This immediately gave rise to "suspicions, sometimes reasonable, about the use of mechanism in bad faith".

The report also noted that, on the day of the second round of the presidential election, at least eight polling stations abroad – three in the United Kingdom, two in Germany, two in Italy, and one in France – closed early because the 5,000 ballot papers allocated to them had run out. At the same time, because of the large influx of voters, nine polling stations had to extend their working hours in the first round and five in the second round [26]. These facts provided grounds for increasing the number of polling stations in Western Europe in subsequent elections.

In its report on the 2021 early parliamentary elections, Promo-LEX again noted: "The constitution of polling stations abroad was discontinuous, with no public consultation and sound substantiation of decisions, and certain suspicions concerning political influence on certain CEC decisions were sometimes noticed". The CEC initially voted in favour of 139 polling stations, even though it had budgeted funds for opening 150 stations for these elections, and MFAEI had stated that it was prepared to open 191. Following criticism, the CEC eventually increased the number of polling stations to 150 [23; 32].

The distribution of polling stations by country proposed by Promo-LEX and the one adopted by the CEC again differed, although not substantially. In particular, Promo-LEX considered that 15 polling stations should be opened in Russia, but the CEC retained 17 [23].

In the 2024 presidential election, Promo-LEX was satisfied with the CEC’s decision on polling stations abroad. By that point, the Electoral Code had established that the main basis for setting up polling stations was the dynamics of voter turnout at polling stations abroad in the three most recent elections [27].

According to Promo-LEX estimates, based on the dynamics of voter turnout in the three most recent elections, 10 polling stations should have been established in Russia. The CEC, however, initially decided to establish five polling stations there, and the Promo-LEX report stated: "We consider justified the position taken by public authorities regarding security risks that may affect the freedom of voting". The report also noted that the number of registrations in the Russian Federation stood at 8,238 eligible voters, eight times higher than in 2021, while the overall number of registrations had halved. This created "a certain distrust in the veracity and "good faith" of the requests registered by the CEC". The report further stated: "The Russian Federation seems to be the only state out of the 37 where PSs will be opened that has officially commented on the number of PSs established on its territory, which demonstrates a special interest for the electoral process in the Republic of Moldova" [28].

Subsequently, however, District Electoral Council (DEC) No. 38 decided, contrary to the CEC decision, to establish only two precinct electoral bureaus (PEB) in the Russian Federation rather than five. It justified this by stating that the MFA had withdrawn its proposals for candidates to form three of the precinct electoral bureaus, on the grounds that it was unable to ensure security conditions. In its decision of 29 September 2024, the CEC required the MFA to propose members for these three PEBs and required DEC No. 38 to revise its decision and establish five PEBs in the Russian Federation [29]. However, this decision was not implemented, and only two polling stations operated in Russia.

In the 2025 elections, Promo-LEX calculations again indicated that 10 polling stations should have been established in Russia. This time, however, it was the CEC itself that decided to establish only two polling stations, citing "obligation of the state to guarantee the security of its citizens". Similar decisions were also reported with regard to Ukraine and Israel [3; 25]. In both Ukraine and Israel, however, only two polling stations had always been established; in both countries, the Moldovan diaspora is much smaller than in Russia, and the number of voters there was also lower (moreover, distances in Israel are not comparable to those in Russia).

The report also noted: "Promo-LEX OM considers that in addition to threats to citizens’ security, there are also vulnerabilities related to the integrity of the electoral process". As for the large number of prior registrations from Russia, which accounted for 81% of all registrations, these "raise reasonable suspicions that most of the registrations were made personally by the voters and denote a concerted action to mislead the electoral authority and the public opinion" [25]. According to Russian sources, more than 26,000 Moldovan citizens registered from Russia [7].

In our view, the increase in the number of polling stations in Europe was fully justified. In Russia, by contrast, reducing the number of polling stations to two was undoubtedly discriminatory. Living in Russia, we regard security concerns as greatly exaggerated (except in the case of Kursk and possibly Lipetsk). The argument concerning the "integrity of the electoral process" is understandable, since Russian elections provide grounds for such concerns. However, as a basis for decision-making, it must be supported by sufficient evidence relating specifically to voting in Moldovan elections. For now, what we see (Tables 3, 6, and 7) is that vote returns at polling stations in Russia – especially in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also in Sochi, Tula, Ryazan, and Surgut – were less monolithic than in Western countries.

On Campaigning and the Mobilisation of Voters Abroad

Since one of the main issues in Moldovan elections is the republic’s foreign-policy orientation, both Russia and the EU countries – or the West more broadly – clearly have an interest in their outcome. Russian sources write about this more openly. Maia Sandu is described either as a "protégé of the US State Department" [34] and a "creature of the United States" [8], or as a "political project of Brussels" [10]. It is also argued that "Russia is extremely interested in keeping the whole of Moldova, together with Transnistria, within its sphere of influence, and therefore supports pro-Russian forces there" [4]. One Russian analyst observed: "It would be unnatural if people in Russia were not rooting for the socialists, although the excessive passions of domestic 'supporters' may do them a disservice" [8].

During recent campaigns, Moldovan official bodies repeatedly accused Russia of illegal activities in Moldovan elections, including vote buying inside Moldova [18]. In the context of our study, however, the more relevant question is the extent to which foreign states and organisations interfere in the voting processes of the Moldovan diaspora. More specifically, are the resources of foreign states and organisations used to mobilise Moldovan voters?

In Russian academic writing, we find only unsupported assertions, for example: "The unprecedented activity of the diaspora in EU countries suggested that it was there that illegal methods were used to incentivise voters in favour of the pro-Western contender" [9]. Moldovan authors are more cautious: "Like the 2020 presidential election, Sandu’s victory was saved by the Moldovan diaspora in the West, who mobilised at unprecedented numbers to secure her victory” [22]. Russian media write more openly, referring to the bribery of voters abroad and direct falsifications [16; 37], but without serious evidence.

Unfortunately, observation organisations focus on analysing the domestic election campaign, and their reports therefore say almost nothing about mobilisation campaigns abroad.

Previous studies have noted that pro-European political actors in Moldova began working systematically with the diaspora in 2015, implementing a number of important programmes. During the election campaign, Maia Sandu addressed the Western diaspora in terms it understood, presenting herself as a guarantor of a stronger course towards European integration, which naturally corresponded to the interests and expectations of this part of Moldovan society [2]. Social media played a major role in mobilising the electorate that supported Sandu in 2020 (the pandemic increased the importance of social media, but for the diaspora it is in any case an indispensable tool) [2; 21].

Electoral statistics can provide some insight into mobilisation. As noted above, there is nothing surprising in the fact that the diaspora in Europe (as well as in the US and Canada) votes for pro-European parties and candidates. It should be acknowledged that in the presidential campaigns of 2016, 2020, and 2024, the pro-European camp already had a de facto common candidate in the first round – Sandu – while the other pro-European candidates were fringe. In parliamentary elections, however, pro-European parties have usually competed in several separate blocs or lists (except in 2021). This makes it useful to compare their results in Moldova and in EU countries.

In 2014, diaspora voting was not monolithic. In EU countries, PLDM received 38.5%, the Liberal Party 20.4%, and PDM 11.6%; in Moldova, their results were 18.9%, 8.9%, and 15.6% respectively. By 2019, however, voting in EU countries had become more consolidated: the ACUM bloc received 74.6%, while PDM received only 4.6% (in Moldova, the corresponding figures were 23.6% and 24.0%). The same pattern appeared in 2025: PAS received 76.7% in EU countries, while the Alternative bloc received only 2.0%; in Moldova, the corresponding figures were 43.2% and 9.0%. At the very least, this points to one-sided information flows among voters abroad.

Conclusion

Let us now return to the questions posed in the introduction. The first two have already been answered in the preceding sections. Without the diaspora vote, the outcomes of both the 2024 referendum and the 2024 presidential election would have been different. Within Moldova, a majority of citizens voted against amending the Constitution to include the republic’s accession to the founding treaties of the European Union, and voted for Stoianoglo in the presidential election. Without the diaspora vote, PAS would also have failed to win an absolute majority of seats in the 2025 elections.

The second question has also been answered: the decisions to increase the number of polling stations in Europe were justified, whereas the decisions to reduce their number in Russia were not.

The third question is more difficult: did these decisions affect the election results? As shown above, the number of voters in Europe and America grew faster than the number of polling stations. It is therefore reasonable to assume that even without the increase in polling stations in these countries, the result there would have been roughly the same.

In Russia, the reduced number of polling stations appears to have reduced the number of voters. This was especially clear in the second round of the 2024 presidential election, when the 10,000 ballot papers allocated to Russia simply ran out. The number of voters could also have been higher if polling stations had been opened outside Moscow in the 2025 parliamentary elections and in the 2024 referendum (held alongside the first round of the presidential election).

But how much higher? The only reliable figure available is 14,068, the number of people who voted in the second round of the 2020 presidential election, the highest figure recorded in all the years under study. Another figure, although less reliable, is the 26,000 people who registered for the 2025 elections. We do not know how many of them were from Moscow, but we do know that 4,205 people voted in Moscow. Even taking the number of registered voters and subtracting the number who voted gives an estimate of roughly 20,000 people.

Let us recall that in the 2024 presidential election, Sandu finished 179,709 votes ahead of her opponent. In the 2025 parliamentary elections, PAS received 792,557 votes. To obtain 50% of the total votes cast for the parties included in seat allocation, it needed only 743,389 votes, that is, 49,168 fewer votes than it actually received. Therefore, even if 20,000–25,000 more voters had cast ballots in Russia, this would not have affected the outcome of either the presidential or the parliamentary elections.

The situation with the referendum was different. Here the gap between the "yes" and "no" votes was only 10,564, meaning that an additional 11,000 votes from Russia could have proved decisive. This, however, is not the only objection raised in relation to the referendum results. As experts noted, the Electoral Code states that a referendum decision is deemed adopted if it is supported by a majority of the voters who took part in the referendum. Yet the "yes" vote received a majority not of all those who voted, but only of valid ballots. The Constitutional Court examined the results protocol and ruled that the referendum was valid, interpreting the law as requiring the results to be determined on the basis of valid votes [10; 33].

However, experts noted that, at this stage of the negotiation process between Chisinau and Brussels, there was no need for this referendum, and that holding it was a political strategy designed to increase electoral support for Sandu [10; 22; 31].

The situation that has emerged in Moldovan elections also raises a broader question: should the diaspora participate in elections? The problems associated with voting by citizens abroad (external voting) have been discussed for some time. It has been noted that the number of migrants, especially labour migrants, has been growing in recent decades, and that this trend affects a large number of countries [38].

There have also been repeated cases in practice where diaspora voting has played a decisive role. Examples include the 2006 elections to the Italian Senate [41: 33] and the 2009 Romanian presidential election [36].

In many countries, citizens living abroad can take part in elections without returning to their home country, although various restrictions often apply [38]. International standards, however, do not impose such obligations [1]. For example, the Venice Commission’s recommendations state that "the right to vote and to stand for election may be granted to citizens residing abroad" [35: 332], (which means that this right may also be withheld). Only the Chisinau Convention, ratified by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan, states: "Every citizen who resides or is present outside the territory of his or her state during national elections shall have equal electoral rights with other citizens of that state. Diplomatic missions and consular offices, and their officials, shall assist citizens in exercising their electoral rights and freedoms" [15: 427].

In Armenia, however, citizens abroad were deprived of the opportunity to vote even before the 2007 parliamentary elections. Experts believe that this was a reaction to the vote returns in the 2003 presidential election, when most Armenians in the United States voted for the opposition candidate [30].

A similar decision was adopted in Georgia in December 2025 [6]. Its initiators cited the Moldovan precedent "to deprive opponents of the opportunity to use the instrument of the diaspora abroad to destabilise the domestic political system" [5].

On the one hand, all citizens of a country should have equal rights regardless of their place of residence or temporary stay. This is especially true when the citizens in question make a substantial contribution to their country’s economy through remittances. On the other hand, a number of factors may make voting abroad difficult or undesirable.

The first point to bear in mind is that the organisation of voting abroad requires considerable resources, especially when a large number of polling stations is opened. At the same time, if only a small number of polling stations is opened in a very large country (such as Russia, the United States, Canada, and indeed some European countries) many voters living far from those stations are effectively deprived of the opportunity to vote.

There is also some force to the argument that citizens living in their own country vote more responsibly than citizens in the diaspora, since they experience the consequences of their vote directly and continuously. Citizens living in the country are also better placed to observe changes in everyday life and to make an informed judgement about whether a particular candidate deserves support. The diaspora, by contrast, receives information mainly from the media and social networks, which do not always give an accurate picture of events [21]. It may therefore be assumed that diaspora voting is more vulnerable both to vote buying and to various forms of emotional influence.

This may be why certain obstacles to voting abroad have some rationale: they ensure that voting is undertaken only by those citizens for whom it is important enough to justify overcoming significant barriers, such as prior registration, travel to the polling station, and queues.

The protection of state sovereignty remains a separate issue. Diaspora voting may be subject to the influence of other states, especially when the diaspora is large and the election results have a major impact on the state’s foreign policy. The very fact that a citizen is present on the territory of another state means that he or she is exposed to that state’s influence. Such influence, however, may also be deliberate.

This makes oversight of campaigning among citizens in the diaspora necessary. So far, there is little evidence of such oversight. Dedicated standards need to be developed for campaigning and voting in the diaspora, as do specific systems and methods. This will be relevant for many states in which a significant share of citizens live and work abroad.

The author thanks G.V.Sherstyuk for his assistance in preparing the electoral statistics of the Republic of Moldova.

Received 25.02.2026, revision received 9.03.2026.

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