The Need to Structure the Criteria of Party Institutionalization: Problem Statement

Lazarev A.V.

Abstract

When studying parties as a political institution, political scientists use various parameters that allow them to assess the characteristics and distinctive properties of party evolution. This paper reviews specific indicators used by political scientists in the study of party institutionalization and examines the most widely used and effective ones. At the same time, the author argues the need to develop a systematic approach to the criteria of party institutionalization — an approach that does not yet exist. Political scientists either invent indicators of their own that they use to analyze the process of party institutionalization or improve the old ones used by their predecessors. As a result, these indicators increase in both complexity and number. On the one hand, such a setting is conducive to a more thorough study of different aspects of party institutionalization and of the ways they correlate. On the other hand, there is a risk of involving multiple diversified parameters as research tools — parameters that do not always combine and may even contradict one another. In this case, the combined use of such indicators reduces the likelihood of arriving at valid scientific conclusions. Therefore, the need of clearly structuring criteria of party institutionalization is gaining relevance as an issue. A more structured approach will help prevent some mistakes and improve the quality of future research papers.

---

The challenge of expanding the number of criteria

The history of parties goes back more than 200 years (and the history of political representation goes back many centuries). As of yet, parties have become an integral component of the political structure of many countries. More and more party systems come into being in countries with no prior history of having such. The parties themselves are constantly evolving, resulting in changes in the way they develop, their functions, goals, size, interaction with the target audience and stakeholders, tactics in relation to rival parties, role in government formation, significance in reinforcing or changing the existing political regime, and other attributes. In the course of their historical development, parties (and the political relations associated with them) become institutionalized, that is, they acquire "value and sustainability". At the same time, if it is possible to determine the parameters of party institutionalization, then scientific research reaches a new level, becomes more detailed and multifaceted, acquires comparative potential: it becomes possible to study and compare different parties both in a single country and the strength of political systems of several countries [11: 33]. "In politics, institutionalization means that political actors have clear and stable expectations about the behavior of other actors. An institutionalized party system, then, is one in which actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior will prevail into the foreseeable future. In an institutionalized party system, there is stability in who the main parties are and how they behave" [21: 206]. The process of party formation serves important functions: it streamlines and modernizes the political system as a whole, tones down radicalism and ensures that political transformations go smoothly. It also forces political elites to be more active and accountable, promotes mobilization and socialization of citizens.

Political scientists devised a large number of different indicators that make it possible to determine the level of party institutionalization in the country. At present, the number of such indicators keeps growing, and political scientists have yet to reach a consensus on which indicators prove the most effective in conducting research. Indeed, "there is much disagreement among scholars about the ways of conceptualizing the criteria of political institutionalization, their operationalization and measurement" [24: 18]. Today, the context is such that "almost every writer has come up with his own operationalization of the notion [of party system institutionalization]" [3: 118].

On the one hand, due to the accumulated set of parameters, the process of party institutionalization can be studied more closely and thoroughly. On the other hand, the resulting set of indicators shows that not all of them complement each other, but, on the contrary, they may be contradictions. A researcher runs the risk of mixing diversified, non-congruent parameters of party institutionalization with each other, which, in turn, may decrease the reliability of scientific conclusions. Therefore, today's context requires a more rigorous structuring of the existing variation indicators that are used by different scholars in analyzing the formation of parties as an institution.

Moreover, in the future, the intensive formation of new indicators may raise the question of drawing up a unified list of universal criteria that would be recognized by the majority of political scientists. At present, parties are mostly studied in counties with established relations. However, when there is a common list of institutionalization parameters, the study can be extended to countries with very different political systems.

This overview has collected and, using the descriptive method, described the most meaningful criteria of party institutionalization most often used by political scientists. The author concludes that a more organized system is needed to group and organize all the multiplicity of indicators of party institutionalization, which may help to avoid certain mistakes in further research. The compilation of such detailed categories and subdivisions, accommodating similar compatible indicators of party institutionalization, as well as the creation of a single universal classification of criteria in the future may become the subjects of future scholarly publications.

Democracy and authoritarianism

The conclusions of studies of party institutionalization in certain countries will be more reliable and accurate if the researcher bears in mind certain considerations. First of all, it is necessary to determine whether the political regime of the country of interest is democratic or authoritarian. The type of regime will determine the composition of party institutionalization indicators (which the researcher intends to analyze): how relevant they are in relation to the peculiarities of the political system of a given country.

Many political scientists study parties exclusively in democracies (e.g., [13; 22]), without considering parties existing under authoritarian regimes. Others outline certain conditions and only then proceed to analyze party institutionalization in the respective countries. For example, Fernando Casal Bértoa focuses on countries that meet the following conditions: display a score of at least six points in the Polity index (i.e., that meet the minimalist set of attributes that make a country a democracy [28]); where universal suffrage elections have been held at least once (or, to say the least, in which all males could vote); where governments are formed by and rely on a parliamentary majority, rather than on the exclusive will of the head of state [4: 414].

Nevertheless, one cannot reject certain types of autocracies that give parties comparative freedom of action, chances to compete with each other and fight for power. Andreas Schedler points out that competitiveness of party systems is precisely the factor that helps differentiate between competitive and uncompetitive authoritarian regimes. That said, the high or moderate level of competitiveness is conducive to studies of the process of party institutionalization: "While democracy is "a system in which parties lose elections," electoral authoritarianism is a system in which opposition parties lose elections. Still, the relative strength of opposition forces varies substantially among electoral autocracies" [35: 46-47].

Moreover, certain political scientists made the development of party institution in authoritarian regimes their research interest. However, these political scientists do acknowledge that authoritarian practices of state governance inhibit the formation of parties and their systems. As a result, scholars pay close attention to party institutionalization in those regions of the world where many countries are not democracies: Latin America [17; 20], Asia [10; 31], and Africa [19; 37]. The authoritarian political elite uses legislation, informal arrangements, corruption, and violence to control the party system, but still does not eliminate it completely and allows it to modify itself within the framework it establishes. If the "rules of the game" are respected, parties are allowed to continue their activities, so the development of the party system (or at least its lengthy transformation with an uncertain outcome) continues.

Party institutionalization therefore moves at its own pace in both democratic and some authoritarian regimes. At the same time, the advantage of the former over the latter are political institutions that are not subject (mostly, at least) to manual control, but instead function independently and autonomously. For this reason, the evolution of parties in democracies proceeds in a free and unhindered manner. This means that only some indicators, which are not so strongly influenced by directive interference from influential players and which continue to remain relatively objective, are suitable for analyzing party institutionalization in authoritarian countries. At the same time, the absolute majority of these indicators can also be applied to the study of parties in democratic countries. This way, a researcher can compile a collective list of matching criteria for a comparative study. If the researcher's attention is focused exclusively on democratic states, the list of parameters of party institutionalization will be much more extensive and detailed. However, occasionally these indicators may still require extra clarification, as each country has its own institutional design, political culture, and established formal and informal rules.

Institutionalization of parties and institutionalization of party systems

The next pitfall to be considered in the study of party institutionalization is the conceptual distinction between the process of party institutionalization (PI) and the process of party system institutionalization (PSI). Vicki Randall and Lars Svasand note that PI and PSI are distinct phenomena that are far from being proximate, much less interchangeable: "But there are also significant ways or contexts in which the imperatives of individual party institutionalization and institutionalization of the party system as a whole could be at odds" [30: 8]. Radoslaw Markowski also emphasizes that the relationship between party institutionalization and party system institutionalization is not straightforward, but can be inverse or whatsoever absent: "In some instances the institutionalization of parties, their organizational stability and continuity might prove conducive to party system institutionalization but in other instances not necessarily, particularly in the case of young democracies" [23: 56]. New fragile democracies take guidance from stable democracies: they seek to, as soon as possible, adopt and improve the effectiveness of newly created political institutions, including the party system, without thinking about strengthening individual parties, whose development may for a long time remain incipient. The experience of countries with a dominant party also testifies to the mismatch between PI and PSI: while the dominant party crystallizes and progresses, the others eventually become only its willing or unwilling allies and are forced to follow its policies; the result is a party system that is entirely unsound [8: 37-38].

Without a doubt, the line between PI and PSI is rather thin, and some political scientists [33] easily move within the process of analyzing the components of these two phenomena, equating them to each other, considering them as links in the same chain and making a general final conclusion. However, the quality of the study will still improve if the criteria characterizing the PI and PSI levels are not combined in a single unit of indicators (which is compiled to study party institutionalization) due to the lack of congruent links between them. It is more correct for various academic works to consider party institutionalization and party system institutionalization as separate entities.

Abstract and empirical criteria

Another line of demarcation that contributes to the systematization of institutional indicators lies between such variable parameters (calculating both the PI and PSI levels in both democratic and authoritarian countries) as abstract (qualitative) and empirical (quantitative). Political scientists often use indicators from only one of these two categories: for example, they ignore any quantitative indicators, but elaborate on the qualitative properties and states of parties or their systems.

That said, Samuel Huntington was one of the first researchers to establish the abstract parameters of PI. His list goes as follows: adaptability of a political organization (in particular, a party), which is formed by pressure from the environment; complexity, which is expressed both in the hierarchical and functional multiplication of the organization's subdivisions and in the differentiation of certain types of its structural units; autonomy as the extent to which political organizations and procedures are independent of other social associations and modes of behavior; coherence as the extent to which the group's agreement on its functional boundaries and conflict resolution procedures within said boundaries is consensual [11: 33-44].

The two qualitative criteria of PI highlighted by Angelo Panebianco are similar to those suggested by Huntington. The first is the degree of autonomy of the party in relation to its environment, i.e. the presence of an influential central apparatus, the party's ability to obtain financial resources, to manage the activity of regional branches and affiliated organizations, to choose a chairperson from among its members and not from an external interest group, to control deputies of legislative bodies of various levels. The second is the degree of systemic consistency of the party, i.e. the level of interaction between its various internal segments, including the ability of the central apparatus to control both the party's structural units and the interaction with the external environment, resulting in a homogeneous and more institutionalized organization [26: 55-57].

According to Kenneth Janda, a party will be considered institutionalized if it is "reified" in the public consciousness [12: 19].

Stephen Levitsky identifies two concepts of PI. The first is value infusion, when the main goal of party actors shifts from achieving specific party objectives to prolonging the existence of the organization as such. The second is "behavioral routinization", which refers to creation of party rules, procedures, roles and other patterns that become stable, mundane, repeatable and subsequently perceived by actors as permanent models of intraparty interaction [16: 79-81].

When considering the process of formation of parties as an institution, Randall and Swazand draw a four-cell matrix, the cells of which contain the following necessary elements: systemic consistency, which is interpreted after Panebianco as increase in scale, density and regularity of interactions that cement the party as a structure; value infusion, which is interpreted after Levitsky as party functionaries and supporters identifying themselves with the party and committing themselves to it, getting involved in party activities not for selfish pursuits, but for achieving more effective goals; decision-making autonomy, which is interpreted after Huntington as the party's ability to freely determine its policy and strategy, independence from outside interference; "reification", which is interpreted after Janda as the extent to which a party is "established" in the public imagination [30: 9-15].

Other researchers believe that the PI process is influenced, among other things, by such abstract characteristics as a party's establishment in society as an element of political culture, its relations with other parties, the population and the state [7].

As for the empirical (quantitative) indicators of PI, they include, inter alia: the number of national (nationwide) elections in which a party participated (e.g., it must have participated in more than three such elections, otherwise the party cannot be called established, "it is ephemeral") [32: 536]; the commitment of political elites to the existing parties and the facts of running the incumbent head of state in presidential elections from parties (rather than self-nomination with a broad front of support) [33: 22]; a high percentage of citizens (supported by public opinion polls), who openly identify themselves as supporters of a particular party [5: 182]; stability of the population's electoral preferences over the party's long-term existence (a symbiosis of "establishment" and "systemic consistency" of the party — the so-called Index of Party Stabilization) [18: 574-575]; the presence of a party faction in the national parliament; large number of party members; extensive network of regional branches; public trust in the political organization [7].

Still, political scientists focus more on creating party system institutionalization (PSI) criteria than on individual parties. When describing the qualitative (abstract) PSI indicators, Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal emphasize that the level of institutionalization should be considered based on four aspects. The first aspect is the stability of inter-party competition, as in the extent to which the composition of permanent participants in parliamentary and presidential (in which it is the parties that nominate candidates) elections changes. The fewer new, "invading" participants in the electoral market there are, the more stable the system is. The second aspect is the "establishment" of parties in society, as in how high the percentage of voters who identify with parties and consistently vote for them over a long period of time is, and how many interest groups that support parties there are. At the same time, the "establishment" of parties is inseparable from the stability of inter-party competition: if the majority of citizens support one and the same party for several electoral cycles, the electoral volatility decreases. The third aspect is party legitimacy, which means that in more institutionalized party systems, political actors (even if they express skepticism about a particular party or the party system as a whole) come to understand that parties are a necessary part of democratic politics. The fourth aspect is the independent status and value of political organizations: PSI reaches a serious level if parties cease to be personal instruments of certain ambitious leaders or a clique; it becomes easier for such associations to reach regular voters [21: 206-207].

Other abstract PSI parameters can include stability of electoral legislation; consistent commitment of elite representatives to political parties; processes of political and electoral education of elites and public masses after the institution of elections is established [33: 19-20].

In addition to the qualitative ones, there exist multiple empirical (quantitative) indicators of measuring the level of party system institutionalization. The first steps to identify how sound PSI is were taken by the classics of modern political science: Maurice Duverger, Jean Blondel, Giovanni Sartori. They were among the first to classify party systems based on a numerological criterion — the number of existing parties in these systems — and point out that different types of party systems are characterized by different degrees of stability.

Maurice Duverger distinguished between one-party, two-party and multi-party (three-, four- and multi-party) systems. At the same time, the scholar argued that the number of parties that would eventually be formed and that would determine the type of the future party system initially depended on the existing electoral system in the country (one-round plurality voting that resulted in a two-party system, or two-round plurality voting, as well as proportional representation that resulted in a multiparty system [6: 291]).

The numerological approach was developed by Jean Blondel. Unlike Duverger, he took into account not only the number, but also the electoral importance of parties (and focused more on party ideologies). Blondel differentiated between traditional one-party systems, mobilization one-party systems, and systems with more than one party. At the same time, he gave detailed consideration to the third type, which in turn split as follows: two-party, two-and-a-half-party (if two major parties receive in aggregate 75-80% of the popular vote, the third "minor" party — respectively, no more than 25%, but it can have a decisive influence on coalition formation and voting in parliament), multiparty with a dominant party (if such a party receives 40-50% of the popular vote) and multiparty without a dominant party (if several parties receive no more than 25% of the vote each) [1: 83-99].

Giovanni Sartori also prioritized the indicator of the number of parties in the study of party systems, but he did so by adjusting "the numerological classification taking into account the nature of patterned interaction between the main participants of partisan life" [14: 89]. Sartori used the quantitative parameter; first, because this variable can be defined "much more precisely and more easily than any other"; secondly, because it can be used to typologize party systems: each type reflects certain societal splits in a different and fundamental way, and thus gives an idea of ideological polarization of society is getting stronger or weaker. As a result, Sartori's system typology consists of the following categories: 1) one-party totalitarian; 2) one-party authoritarian; 3) one-party pragmatic; 4) hegemonic-ideological; 5) hegemonic-pragmatic; 6) predominant party; 7) twopartisan; 8) moderate multipartism; 9) extreme multipartism; 10) atomized multipartism [34: 254-255]. The degree of institutionalization of these party systems is different: one-party and hegemonic systems and more fragile and unstable due to the lack of inter-party competition, extreme and atomized multipartism systems — due to chaotic competition; while predominant party, twopartisan and moderate multipartism systems are more consolidated and strong due to existing constructive competition between the players.

Along with the numerological indicator there appear quantitative indicators: over time, they prove their effectiveness and gradually become the most widespread mathematical formulas for assessing party systems. First of all, it is about the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties. The ENP indicates how many parties actually matter in the political system (ENEP in the electoral market or ENPP in parliament) [15]. The original indicator of the effective number of parties had a few drawbacks, so researchers proposed different ways of calculating it to improve its accuracy [9; 25]. Another frequently used parameter is electoral volatility. It shows the constancy of voter demand for particular parties [27]. The formula was subject to adjustments and refinements as well [29; 36].

Empirical indicators characterizing the level of PSI continue to increase in complexity. Today, a researcher often goes beyond using individual values (such as ENP and electoral volatility) and develops his or her own individual range of parameters: guided by the specific goals of their research, political scientists first select specific abstract criteria and then operationalize and translate them into unique quantitative indicators.

To study the institutionalization of party systems in contemporary Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, Fernando Casal Bértoa and Peter Mair use complex abstract parameters, which they translate into quantitative indices. The first criterion is the frequency of changes in the composition of the country's government, which is formed by the winning party coalition following the elections: how often new party representatives are appointed to ministerial posts, and how regularly the system is shaken by perturbations in the government. The second is the change of the government: if reshuffles are inevitable (at the next election or in between), to what extent (zero, partial or full) the composition of the ruling administration changes. The third is whether the next government is innovative or routine: the extent to which the administration (created by the parties after an election victory or in the case of government reshuffles) retains its previous composition, whether it is open or closed to allowing new parties into its ruling team. The last one is access to government: whether all parties in the winning coalition had a chance to appoint their representatives to ministerial posts, or whether some organizations were barred from public office. To operationalize these factors, political scientists counted the number of cabinet reshuffles in CEE countries and devised three integral indicators: government change, government innovation and government openness [2].

Casal Bértoa further investigated the level of PSI by means of four other variables: the permanent composition of parties competing from election to election, the format of the party system (the effective number of electoral parties), the type of political system (parliamentary or presidential), and the structure of cleavages in society (the existence of one main or several overlapping social cleavages) [3: 122-126].

The original set of criteria for characterizing the PSI level is applied by Andriy Meleshevich. He narrows them down to two major categories: external autonomy and internal stability of the party system. Three indicators are used to measure external autonomy: the number of independent members of the national parliament elected from a party (in the case of plurality voting) or candidates running on party lists who have never previously served in party factions (in the case of proportional representation); the role of political parties in the formation of the executive branch; and the universal support for parties and the uniformity of citizen's party identification in different regions of the country. The following indicators are used to measure internal stability: the percentage of votes in legislative elections received by "old" parties that have already participated in any previous elections; Mogens Pedersen's volatility index [24: 23-27].

The key importance of stable "rules of the game" and competition between parties is discussed by Staffan I. Lindberg, among others. He monitors changes in eight parameters through which the success of PSI can be judged: the total number of parties in the legislature; the number of new parties in the legislature; the share of new parties; the number of parties voted out of the legislature; the share of parties voted out; the share of seats in the legislature occupied by the largest party and the share of seats in the legislature held by the runner-up (the second largest party by number of deputies); and the Pedersen Volatility Index [19: 222-226].

A set of indicators with internal congruence is provided by Scott Mainwaring. To assess the level of PSI in Latin American countries, he uses thirteen indicators, some of which he developed himself: "Vote share of new party candidates in presidential elections", "Vote share of new parties in lower chamber elections", "Stability of main contenders from one presidential election to the next", "Stability of main contenders from one lower chamber election to the next", "Medium-term stability of main contenders in presidential elections", "Medium-term stability of main contenders in lower chamber elections", "Mean electoral volatility in presidential elections", "Mean electoral volatility in lower chamber elections", "Cumulative electoral volatility in presidential elections" (includes all past elections of this type), "Cumulative electoral volatility in lower chamber elections", "Vote share received by older party candidates in the last presidential election", "Vote share received by older parties in the last lower chamber elections", "Stability in party linkage with society: changes in parties' ideological positions" [20]. Mainwaring is sure that these parameters can be very productive in the future: "These indicators are logically derived from the concept [of party system institutionalization]; they measure phenomena that are by definition a part of PSI. They travel seamlessly across time and space. Most of these indicators are new, and they can fruitfully be used for studying other world regions and other historical periods" [20: 70].

Scholars study party institutionalization through a variety of other parameters as well. The above criteria are just some of the best known and most effective.

Further steps towards structuring the criteria

Political scientists are constantly devising new indicators of party institutionalization. This paper has collected the key ones.

The paper also raises the issue of the existing multiplicity of parameters being isolated and random, and their number continues to grow. The author believes that to overcome this problem, political scientists will initially need to arrange indicators into several categories. Some of the first grouping criteria for parameters may be as follows: the type of political regime in the country (indicators for democratic countries / indicators for authoritarian countries), the object of study (PI indicators / PSI indicators), the properties of the studied criteria (abstract / empirical). The author believes that a stricter organization of the criteria of party institutionalization, their "establishment" in certain categories can facilitate the process of future research.

Care must be taken to ensure that the parameters match each other in logical manner. For example, most of the indicators used to study the institutionalization of parties and party systems in authoritarian countries would be suitable for studying these phenomena in democratic countries. However, many indicators applied to democracies may prove to be incorrect when analyzing autocracies, may contain disguised errors, and therefore should either be accompanied by additional interpretations or discarded altogether. From the same perspective, PI and PSI indicators are not always comparable and corresponding, and may indicate differing trends or may not correlate with each other at all. With respect to abstract and empirical characteristics, when the former is operationalized into the latter, a study normally becomes more valid and comprehensive. Thus, at present there is a need to systematize the parameters of party institutionalization, which will allow future researchers to match the indicators correctly, to avoid being confused by the existing multitude, and, perhaps, to avoid some mistakes as well.

When planning to study the processes of party institutionalization, scholars developed those criteria that seemed to them the most obtainable, objective and best suited for their research work and for a particular country (or group of countries). New indicators have accumulated as a result, and new one continue to emerge. On the one hand, such a situation is conducive to using the existing vast arsenal for developing a concise "set of tools" that can be used to closely study various aspects of party institutionalization in a particular country. On the other hand, the situation neutralizes the possibility of studying the parties and party systems in markedly different countries (or country groups) from a comparative perspective, although such studies may provide fertile ground for research. Therefore, in addition to structuring and categorizing the criteria of party institutionalization, in the long term there may be a need to create a unified classification that, at least at its basic level, could incorporate the majority of countries with both stable and fragile party systems.

If such a typology does emerge, it will be developed using a limited number of relevant indicators, which are suitable for the analysis of party institutionalization processes in countries with heterogeneous party systems. Political scientists will need to reach a consensus on what criteria can be considered common and universal. A potential classification could also be multidimensional and consist of several subdivisions or blocks (each of which would combine congruent, compatible and complementary dimensions, such as, for example, "indicators for democratic countries", "indicators for authoritarian countries", "PI indicators", "PSI indicators", "abstract indicators", "empirical indicators"). Once each of the criteria peculiar to a given country is converted into a quantitative value, the corresponding values are calculated and summed up within each subdivisions, it will be possible (first within said subdivisions, then within the entire classification), to rank the countries by the level of party or party system institutionalization. It is assumed that the resulting ranking will in turn allow to create international rankings of countries, distributing them according to the degree of stability of their parties and party systems.

This paper argues that there is a need to structure the criteria of party institutionalization due to the increasing diversity of said criteria. The subdivisions (groups) of indicators proposed by the author serve as an exploratory step towards such structuring. The paper also raises the issue of the need to develop a unified comprehensive classification of countries by the level of party institutionalization, which will serve as a push for new comparative studies.

Received 08.10.2024, revision received 17.10.2024.

---

References

1. Blondel J. Political parties. A genuine case for discontent? London: Wildwood House, 1978. 237 p.
2. Casal Bértoa F., Mair P. Party system institutionalization across time in post-communist Europe. – Muller-Rommel F., Keman H. (eds). Party government in the new Europe. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2012. P. 85–112. DOI: 10.4324/9780203111611.
3. Casal Bértoa F. Party system institutionalization: a travelling framework? – Casal Bértoa F., Muller-Rommel F. (eds). Party politics and democracy in Europe: essays in honour of Peter Mair. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2016. P. 117–130. DOI: 10.4324/9781315755403.
4. Casal Bértoa F. Political parties or party systems? Assessing the «myth» of institutionalization and democracy. – West European politics. 2017. Vol. 40. Iss. 2. P. 402–429. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2016.1216921.
5. Dalton R., Weldon S. Partisanship and party system institutionalization. – Party politics. 2007. Vol. 13. Iss. 2. P. 179–196. DOI: 10.1177/1354068807073856.
6. Duverger M. Political Parties. Moscow: Akademichesky proekt, 2018. 544 p. (In Russ.)
7. Dyugurova A.I. Indikatory institutsionalizatsii politicheskikh partiy v Rossii [Indicators of Institutionalization of Political Parties in Russia]. – Uchenye Zapiski Kazanskogo Universiteta. 2011. Vol. 153. Book 1. P. 173-180. (In Russ.)
8. Dyugurova A.I. Institutsionalizatsiya partiynoi sistemy: ponyatiye i osnovnyye priznaki [Institutionalization of the Party System: Concept and Main Features]. – Theories and problems of political research. 2012. No. 1. P. 27-46. (In Russ.)
9. Golosov G. The effective number of parties: a new approach. – Party politics. 2010. Iss. 16 (2). P. 171–192. DOI: 10.1177/1354068809339538.
10. Hicken A., Kuhonta E.M. Party system institutionalization in Asia: democracies, autocracies, and the shadows of the past. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 355 p. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781107300385.
11. Huntington S. Political Order in Changing Societies. Moscow: Progress-Traditsiya, 2004. 480 p. (In Russ.)
12. Janda K. Political parties: a cross-national survey. New York: Free Press, 1980. 1019 p.
13. Katz R. The model of party government. – Rohrschneider R., Thomassen J. (eds). The Oxford handbook of political representation in liberal democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. P. 248–267. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198825081.001.0001.
14. Korgunyuk Y.G. Stanovleniye partiynoi sistemy v sovremennoi Rossii [Establishment of a Party System in Modern Russia]. Moscow: INDEM Foundation, Moscow City Teachers' Training University, 2007. 544 p. (In Russ.)
15. Laakso M., Taagepera R. The “effective” number of parties: a measure with application to West Europe. – Comparative political studies. 1979. Vol. 12. Iss. 1. P. 3–27. DOI: 10.1177/001041407901200101.
16. Levitsky S. Institutionalization and Peronism: the concept, the case and the case for unpacking the concept. – Party politics. 1998. Vol. 4. Iss. 1. P. 77–92. DOI: 10.1177/1354068898004001004.
17. Levitsky S. Transforming labor-based parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in comparative perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 304 p. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511615641.
18. Lewis P.G. Party systems in post-communist Central Europe: patterns of stability and consolidation. – Democratization. 2006. Iss. 13 (4). P. 562–583. DOI: 10.1080/13510340600791863.
19. Lindberg S.I. Institutionalization of party systems? Stability and fluidity among legislative parties in Africa’s democracies. – Government and opposition. 2007. Vol. 42. Iss. 2. P. 215–241. DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00219.x.
20. Mainwaring S. Party system institutionalization in contemporary Latin America. – Mainwaring S. (eds). Party systems in Latin America: institutionalization, decay and collapse. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. P. 34–70. DOI: 10.1017/9781316798553.003.
21. Mainwaring S., Torcal M. Party system institutionalization and party system theory after the third wave of democratization. – Katz R.S., Crotty W. (eds). Handbook of party politics. London: SAGE Publications, 2006. P. 204–227. DOI: 10.4135/9781848608047.
22. Mair P. Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy. Moscow: Gaidar Institute Press, 2019. 216 p. (In Russ.)
23. Markowski R. Party system institutionalization in new democracies: Poland – a trend-setter with no followers’. – Lewis P. (eds). Party development and democratic change in post-communist Europe: the first decade. London: Frank Cass, 2001. P. 55–77. DOI: 10.2307/3090308.
24. Meleshevich A.A. Party systems in post-soviet countries: а comparative study of political institutionalization in the Baltic states, Russia and Ukraine. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 262 p. DOI: 10.1057/9780230603615.
25. Molinar J. Counting the number of parties: an alternative index. – The American political science review. 1991. Vol. 85. Iss. 4. P. 1383–1391. DOI: 10.2307/1963951.
26. Panebianco A. Political parties: organization and power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 318 p.
27. Pedersen M.N. The dynamic of European party systems: changing patterns of electoral volatility. – European journal of political research. 1979. Vol. 7. Iss. 1. P. 1–26. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1979.tb01267.x
28. Polity 5: Regime authority characteristics and transitions datasets. – The official site of the Center for Systemic Peace. URL: https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (accessed 08.10.2024). - https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
29. Powell E., Tucker J. Revisiting electoral volatility in post-communist countries: new data, new results and new approaches. – British journal of political science. 2014. Vol. 44. Iss. 1. P. 123–147. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123412000531.
30. Randall V., Svasand L. Party institutionalization in new democracies. – Party politics. 2002. Vol. 8. Iss. 1. P. 5–29. DOI: 10.1177/1354068802008001001.
31. Rogozhina N.G. Politicheskiye partii Tailanda – proverka na prochnost demokratii [Political Parties in Thailand: A Test of Democracy]. – Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law. 2018. Vol. 11. No. 3. P. 102-119. DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240-2018-11-3-102-119. (In Russ.)
32. Rose R., Mackie T.M. Do parties persist or fail? The big trade-off facing organizations. – Lawson K., Merkl P.H. (eds). When parties fail: emerging alternative organizations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. P. 533–558. DOI: 10.1515/9781400859498.533
33. Rose R., Mishler W. Model sprosa i predlozheniya institutsionalizatsii partiynoi sistemy: rossiyskiy sluchai [A Supply-Demand Model of Party-System Institutionalization: The Russian Case]. – Public Opinion Bulletin. 2008. No. 6 (98). P. 19-29. (In Russ.)
34. Sartori G. Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 370 p.
35. Schedler A. Elections without democracy. The menu of manipulation. – Journal of democracy. 2002. Vol. 13, Iss. 2. P. 36–50. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2002.0031.
36. Shpagin S.A. Stabilnost i dinamika partiynoi sistemy v Rossii v 1993-2016 gg. [Stability and Dynamics of Russia's Party System in 1993-2016]. – The Caspian Region: Politics, Economics, Culture. 2018. No. 2 (55). P. 70-77. (In Russ.)
37. Welfling M.B. Political institutionalization: comparative analyses of African party systems. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973. 63 p.