The Distinctive Nature of Local Governments and Municipal Elections

Balabanova O.V., Kiselyov K.V., Kovin V.S., Kryzhov S.B., Rusakova Ye.L., Cherepanova A.F., Cherepanova K.F., Chernikov V.A., Shavshukova N.V., Shapiro L.V.

Abstract

This time, we asked local govermnent experts a series of questions seeking to explain the distinctive nature of municipal elections and how they differ from state government elections. Discussion points include territorial organization of local government, disagreements in representative bodies of municipalities, interaction of deputies with voters, electoral systems used in municipal elections, participation of political parties and other public associations in municipal elections.

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Editorial note

Although there are many academic publications that deal with local self-governance (LSG) in the Russian Federation, their quantity, and, most importantly, their quality, hardly seem acceptable to us. The most important questions remain without adequate answers. That said, the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation pronounced that local self-government bodies were not part of the system of bodies of state power. The 2020 constitutional amendments clarified that local self-government bodies and bodies of state power were part of a single system of public authority in the Russian Federation.

Over the course of three decades of post-Soviet development, the structural pattern of LSG went through repeated change [19; 21; 25]. The Federal Law No. 154-FZ of August 28, 1995, granted the regions wide-ranging authority in this matter, and the application patterns varied from region to region: in some cases LSG was organized at the settlement level, and at the district level in other. The Federal Law No. 131-FZ of October 6, 2003 largely established a two-level LSG system. In recent years, a number of regions started the process of getting rid the settlement level. The first regions to get rid of this level were Magadan and Sakhalin Oblasts, followed by Kaliningrad and Moscow Oblasts, Stavropol Krai, and the Udmurt Republic.

On December 16, 2021, Senator Andrei A. Klishas and Deputy Pavel V. Krasheninnikov submitted to the State Duma a draft federal law No. 40361-8 "On the general principles of organization of local self-government in the unified system of public authority"; on January 25, 2022, the draft was passed in the first reading. The bill provides for the complete dissolution of LSG at the settlement level as well.

In this regard, the special features of LSG remain a matter of debate. Are there fundamental, qualitative differences between local self-government and state government that dictate differences in the organization of these levels of public authority, or are these differences merely quantitative? Can we talk about a unified approach to the organization of local self-government, that would work for small dense settlements, for million-plus cities, and for huge districts all at once?

The problems that go hand in hand with LSG are those of municipal elections, which are necessary to form the representative bodies of municipalities and can also be used to elect heads of said units. Are there any special features to such elections, any qualitative differences from elections of higher level? Do they therefore require special legislative regulation, or can they be regulated by the same rules as elections to the bodies of state power?

Unfortunately, municipal elections did not receive sufficient attention in the academic literature literature. Compared to other elections, they are at the periphery of public interest. There are very few monographs and other summarizing publications (examples include [4; 7; 15; 18; 22; 24] and some others). Most of the attention goes to elections in regional centers and other large cities (e.g., [12]). There are also works describing elections in specific regions (e.g., [2; 10; 13; 16; 20; 23; 26]).

In that context, our editors decided to launch a discussion on the special features of LSG and municipal elections. As part of the absentee roundtable format, we came up with eight questions and reached out to a number of experts with experience of working in local government and/or participating in municipal elections, as well as experience in analyzing municipal electoral processes. Ten experts representing different regions — the city of Moscow, Moscow, Kaluga, Novgorod, Sverdlovsk Oblasts, and Perm Krai — reached back with answers.

We hope that the discussion of the issues raised will not end here, but will be continued on the pages of academic journals, including our own. As part of the absentee roundtable discussion, we can only outline certain points. The discussion inevitably touches on different aspects. First, it is possible to discuss both the ideal model of LSG and Russian reality, both at the present stage of development and in the recent past. Second, our questions concernt different kinds of municipalities, from disappearing rural settlements to million-plus cities, and the answers for each kind may be different. Some other aspects are touched upon in the commentary by one of the discussion participants below.

Preliminary commentary by K.V.Kiselyov

First of all, I would like to make several introductory remarks.

First, my texts included in this review of the absentee roundtable are not theory — both local self-government and municipal elections have already been covered extensively in theoretical literature. My texts are a reflection of my experience serving as a municipal deputy for almost two terms. At the same time, I cannot get rid of the past, where I was a scholar specializing, among other things, in comparative studies and the legal aspects of electoral process management.

Second, I made my best to avoid very broad generalizations, taking into account the fact that although unification processes affected the entire system of local self-government, "taking hold" of each municipality in one way or another, a huge number of cultural, social, managerial, and other features still remain. To imagine the level of difference, one can compare the situation in different municipalities of the same region at one particular point in time. Here is a simple example. On the single voting day in 2019, over 73,000 voters were registered in a single-seat constituency No. 1 in Yekaterinburg. However, a three-seat constituency No. 2 in Malyshevsky Urban Okrug only had 1,837 registered voters. Moreover, a candidate only needed to get about a hundred votes to win in the latter case. The economic and social situation in these territories is obviously beyond compare.

Third, one has to understand that the legal/on-paper/formal situation and, accordingly, its detached analysis can lead to one conclusion, while the knowledge and information obtained through personal participation in shaping of the actual situation often lead to conclusions that are precisely the opposite. I have repeatedly encountered how different methods of studying the electoral situation yield completely different results. Relatively speaking, quantitative research results may differ dramatically from the results of focus groups or observation according to Simon Kordonsky's methodological schemes [9].

Question 1. What are the differences between local self-government as a level of public authority and the powers of state? Are they at all significant and do they affect the formation of local government bodies?

Ye.L.Rusakova

The difference is the direct contact with voters, ideally ensuring citizen participation in decision-making. A municipal deputy who only attends meetings and is uninvolved with voters is ineffective in practice.

O.V.Balabanova

Representation and competence. The people who are involved in local issues to the greatest possible extent solve location-specific issues. First of all, these are issues related to living environment maintenance in the broad sense. Land issues, too!

S.B.Kryzhov

The competences are different, because these two levels deal with different issues of societal management.

The major difference between LSG and bodies of state power is that the former operates on a smaller scale, but the local conditions that require consideration are more varied. LSG is a way of social organization on a territorial basis.

The nature of LSG is closer to that of public organizations, especially in small settlements, and this fact significantly affects how local government bodies are formed.

N.V.Shavshukova

There are functions that the public authorities must perform: ensuring safety and security, road construction, providing healthcare and education. These are unified, recurring functions, and they are in no way different at the local level. Local self-government is the basic and most important level of government. That is where we give the maximum amount of authority and money. Keeping this level at the periphery and out of the system of state power is an utter waste. Unfortunately, Article 12 of the Russian Constitution does not so much protect the independence of LSG as it formalizes its secondary character.

L.V.Shapiro

At the present moment, state power involves executing a variety of functions according to approved regulations, methodologies, etc. within the framework of existing budgets (it is the executive branch, to be more precise — unfortunately, the representative body only acts as a manufacturer of decisions made by the executive power).

Local self-government involves the representative and executive bodies of government, whose purpose is to ensure the local community is functioning properly and its interests are taken into account. In other words, their purpose is to resolve local issues in a way that is optimal for the local community. This role implies significant differences in the relations between local deputies and officials on the one hand and local community members on the other. Such relations are tighter, more recurrent, and more binding.

A.F.Cherepanova, K.F.Cherepanova

The special feature of local self-government is that it independently resolves issues that arise from the very nature of the institution itself. LSG also has a direct connection with the local community and ensures its continued functioning "on the land." This is why it is so important for LSG bodies to be independent of the state government, to be able to meaningfully, efficiently, and competently address issues related to people's livelihoods: water and heat supply, education, health care, housing, living environment maintenance, and others. If the local government does not address these issues, the meaning of local government is lost.

Given these features of LSG, municipal elections are the primary method of forming its bodies. That is, not only deputies of representative bodies, but also heads of municipalities.

V.A.Chernikov

A. The local government cannot reform itself. It has to function according to the laws enacted by the state government, and to act within the limits set by that government.

B. Local government is limited to a territory, outside of which it cannot act. State government operates throughout the whole country.

C. Local government is focused on gaining more freedoms for itself, while state government is focused on restricting those freedoms in the interests of other local governments and the state as a whole.

D. Local government is responds to challenger more easily, and is more prepared to experiment and change things at a local level. State government is inertial, seeks to maintain stability, and is conservative in its approach to change.

K.V.Kiselyov

At the same time, there are differences, and there aren't any. Different cases may yield different results. Speaking of, for example, the activities of regional- and municipal-level deputies, they mostly have similar modes of operation. Meetings, receptions, assistance, gifts, inquiries, lobbying, law-making initiatives, media coverage, reports, etc.

Budgeting attitudes may not make any particularly meaningful difference, either. For example, the 2022 revenue budget of a subject of the Russian Federation like Pskov Oblast amounts to about 47.88 billion rubles. The revenue budget of Yekaterinburg municipality for the same year amounts to 56.41 billion rubles. At the same time, the population of Pskov Oblast is a little over 600 thousand, and that of the Yekaterinburg municipality is about 1.5 million.

Differences start to emerge when we try to analyze the powers the two entities have. For example, Yekaterinburg cannot establish an election system for itself, but any constituent entity of the Russian Federation can do this for its municipality. This is why Yekaterinburg residents who want to restore direct elections of the head of a municipality are forced to appeal to the regional level of government, where they expectedly get one refusal after another. The differences in tax powers and others are, naturally, fundamental. In this regard, there has been a very telling trend over the recent years, where the powers of municipalities are gradually scaled back. By and large, the way it works today is that a subject (region) of the Russian Federation has the right to take away absolutely any powers from any of its municipalities. Just like that, all of a sudden, without much reasoning. The new legislation only develops this trend, incorporating local self-governance into the all-too-common vertical, contrary to all charters, common sense, and the laws of social development.

V.S.Kovin

LSG has a fundamental difference — the opportunity for proactive self-organization from the grassroots. This means the opportunity to identify a certain range of issues that citizens are able to resolve on their own — through personal initiative and funds, on their own free time, and using their own human capital — that is, without resorting to outside help, from the state (examples include cleaning the area where they live from garbage). In order to do this, they "only" need to organize a fairly simple system of collection and distribution of financial and other resources to address these local issues; a system that would work in a relatively small and spatially limited area, within walking distance during the day for all residents of the community.

"Localness" is one of the key characteristics here. The educational system, for example, can hardly be local, since it must also ensure integration into the "big" world. On the other hand, the system of local, "internal" public transportation can very well be local, etc. Everything that can be organized at the local level by the community itself and at its discretion should be self-organized and self-governed. This is also fundamental to the formation of self-governing bodies: all LSG bodies should be formed exclusively at the grassroots, by the residents themselves, and within an established local community ("locality"). That said, the size of this self-governing space is determined solely by the community itself, based on the its maturity and awareness that its own resources are sufficient to sustain self-governance. Relatively speaking, if the residents of a settlement (regardless of its size) realize that they can independently, with their own resources, exercise a minimum set of local powers, then they must be granted this right, and they must be able to form independent LSG bodies.

Question 2. What is the optimal territorial level for forming and running a local government considering all its specificities?

S.B.Kryzhov

The level of "walking distance" that takes the territorial organization into account — towns, settlements, and districts in large cities.

Ye.L.Rusakova

A minimum number of voters per deputy is desirable. Territoriality depends on population density. For example, the representation norm in Moscow is too high.

V.S.Kovin

A two-level system — settlement and district (okrug) — with adequate financial support for each of the levels seems optimal. That said, the settlement should be the basic level, while the district level should be regarded as a "union" or "confederation" of settlements, with all that entails.

O.V.Balabanova

The whole range should be available — the choice is up to the population. I don't accept the argument about lack of finances. The activities of the deputies themselves are not financially expensive (desks, chairs, paper, a PC and a printer). The chiefs in the settlements used to get tax breaks, for example. And people would take up the chief position with great interest. Executive bodies can be optimized by creating consolidated treasuries, accounting departments, procurement departments, etc. (certain or all services on the execution of decisions made by the boards can be outsourced).

N.V.Shavshukova

There is no definite answer to this question. Over the past 20 years in the West, we have seen a trend for municipal reforms, or, more precisely, reforms that involve consolidation of small units into larger ones with the transfer of powers to said units — simultaneous decentralization that is. However, numerous studies show that agglomeration did not make much of a difference [1; 6]. In our case, we need to study the already agglomerated municipalities and compare them to those that did not go through reform. We need to take the global experience into account as well. But in any case, municipalities the size of an average European region — as can be seen in Moscow Oblast — do not have the right to exist.

V.A.Chernikov

A. The settlement and its surrounding areas (mini-agglomeration) is the most optimal level. Experience shows that the usual response to "Where do you live?" is "The village of Pupkino, Nozhkinsky District, Golovansk region". This means that a government elected by the people should exist where the people themselves clearly define the boundaries of their local life.

B. The question of "optimal level" seems somewhat flawed. The optimal approach may vary from situation to situation. The main thing is that the territory where the local government is formed should be perceived by the residents themselves as "their own," as the territory where the residents have shared interests that often come into conflict with the interests of the neighboring territory. The internal distinction between "us" and "them" is an extremely important aspect in defining the boundaries of the territory where local power is exercised. An aspect that is important for its subsequent functioning.

L.V.Shapiro

It is necessary for citizens to have direct access to their government (say, within walking distance or access by local transport). Local governments must know their territory as a whole and the specifics of its constituent parts, the composition of the population, and the specifics of its life activities.

For rural areas, there should be a combination of: 1) local government in large settlements, villages or conglomerations of several small rural localities (rural settlements, according to the current legislation), where issues of daily life management are addressed, and 2) the district level of local government, where issues of functioning and development of the territory as part of the region are addressed in the interests of many closely spaced local settlements. The same structure of local government seems to be optimal for small towns (up to 30-50 thousand people).

In larger cities, local government must be organized at the city level. This is determined by the need to operate unified systems of urban economy: all public utilities and social systems (health, education, social security, culture). I cannot say how reasonable it would be to form local self-government at the inner-city district level.

K.V.Kiselyov

I would not want to invent an ideal model by determining the "optimal" level. Every situation is different. In general, I highly doubt that anyone can "set" such an optimal level. On the other hand, it is possible to imagine a kind of ideal LSG model. A certain ideal type (following M. Weber). But such an ideal-type-based construct only makes sense in one respect — to see how far the actual situations are removed from it. You do not have to be an analyst to draw conclusions about "enormous distance."

If we come back to reality, the last significant experiment (if we ignore, for the time being, the most recent potential legislative innovations) was the attempt to divide million-plus cities into districts with their own representative governments with a certain set of powers that would be "close" to the population. Chelyabinsk is the city closest to Yekaterinburg, and was deemed a good fit for such an experiment. How was the choice made? It is hard to say. It seems like it was made based on whoever they felt was "expendable". Yekaterinburg never got beyond the discussion stage — the city managed to defend itself. Chelyabinsk experiment is has been recognized as a failure (see, for example: [11]).

But new large-scale experiments lie ahead, and it seems they aim to further destroy the local government. Finally, if we consider optimality outside the context of territory, outside of some kind of "walking distance" context where the LSG structures are turned into some kind of neighborhood store, then the optimal local government will be the one that is provided with the powers and the money necessary to exercise them.

A.F.Cherepanova, K.F.Cherepanova

We believe that retaining the two-level system of local self-government is most optimal, where the first level is that of the settlement, and the second is that of intracity districts, urban and municipal districts. Abolishing the settlement level of local self-government will not only put extra distance between the local government and the citizens, but will also accelerate the process of extinction of rural areas, the out-migration of community activists, the formation of power voids and crime hotspots. Rural residents will not have direct representation in the local government body of a municipal (urban) district, or this representation will be minimal. The lack of authority and resources to execute them at the settlement level will create situations where local issues will not be addressed at all. The new Klishas-Krasheninnikov bill on local self-governance proposes to abolish the settlement level. Local self-government in rural areas will be replaced by village heads (a form of public participation in local self-government). With no powers or budget, they will collect proposals and pass them "to the central government" without any guarantee of achieving a result. For example, the decision to clear a village street of snow will be made by an official who is 50 to 100 km away from the village itself. One can imagine how "efficient" such management would be.

We believe that the actual (not the declared) goal of eliminating the settlement level of local self-government is not so much to optimize the administrative apparatus and cut budget spending as it is to alienate the people from the government. At the same time, the authors of the bill do not provide a single example of when the administrative costs of combining municipalities into a district have been reduced. It is unethical and politically irresponsible to carry out reform for the sake of budgetary savings without providing the public with specific programs detailing the reasons, goals, and results. The need for administrative transformation of the territory must come from its development needs; it must be be a means of development, not the end goal in itself.

According to an opinion poll conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (September 2020), local self-governance is highly valued in Russian society: 75% of respondents stated the importance of LSG. At the same time, since 2017, sociologists have recorded an increase in people's distrust of local self-government, which can be explained by its inefficient organization [Petukhov 2022]. Deprived of powers and funding, the local government cannot address the issues of the community. Agglomeration of municipalities and redistribution of powers to state government level will lead to an even greater alienation of citizens from self-government and an increase in distrust of the authorities.

Question 3. What are the issues that cause most disagreement in the representative body of a municipality? Does the party structure reflect these disagreements?

S.B.Kryzhov

These primarily include issues of budget and property, urban planning, and housing and utilities organizations. The ruling party majority tends to lobby for the interests of the executive branch.

A.F.Cherepanova, K.F.Cherepanova

On issues of the budget, its planning, spending priorities, inter-budgetary relations as well as issues of road maintenance and area improvement. As a rule, deputies belonging to one party vote in solidarity on all important issues.

N.V.Shavshukova

Disagreements inevitably arise when budget is discussed. United Russia representatives push through the decisions of "higher-level authorities"; they do not see themselves as an independent power, and they often ignore the interests of the locals.

O.V.Balabanova

It all depends on a specific situation. The budget, the charter, and the master plan are always the main topics. The party structure may reflect these disagreements, but a specific deputy will always be the main speaker, and it is this deputy who will have to respond, not the entire party. Party arrangements are certainly present. Is this a negative factor? It is an inherent element of politics.

V.S.Kovin

Disagreements most often occur over the ways and mechanisms of allocation of their own resources. Whose hands should they be in—private, public (municipal) or state? This essentially reflects the ideological differences between the left and the right, the statists and the liberals. Another thing is that at the local level, these disagreements are most often outwardly personalized.

Ye.L.Rusakova

In my experience, the greatest disagreements are those on the subject of interaction with the executive branch. Deputies are divided into legal managers, who consider it possible to act only in the legal field, and "business managers", who consider it possible to "negotiate" with the executive branch for specific economic results, even if this entails participating in gray schemes.

L.V.Shapiro

Disagreements emerge when certain decisions are made: those that infringe on the interests of residents in general, or those that spark conflict between different social groups or residents of different territories.

In a normal multi-party representative body, deputies resolve these issues by reaching consensus. However, in the context of party monopoly, decisions are made automatically, when the head of the local branch snaps their finger (and the head is usually the head of the administration, which makes the representative body an assembly line).

V.A.Chernikov

I don't have that kind of statistics. Empirically, I can say that the importance of party affiliation decreases depending on the number of residents in the municipality. The settlement of Detchino (populaton of 5,000) in Kaluga Oblast could serve as a practical illustration: several years ago, all of the United Russia deputies voted against placing a landfill there, despite the fact that the governor, who was United Russia's leader in the region, wanted it placed. And in the city of Kaluga (population of 360,000), the deputies elect the governor-endorsed head of administration every two years. And I mean the deputies from all parties.

K.V.Kiselyov

The party structure in representative bodies has absolutely nothing to do with the real interests represented. In most municipalities, the representative government (despite party structuring) is a mere appendage of the municipal administration. Representative bodies of local government that are segmented are a much rarer sight. But this segmentation, I repeat, has no partisan basis. Most often it has something to do with to the interests of the elites.

The main points of conflict in any more or less structured municipal representative body are related to issues of urban planning and improvement: changes in the rules of land use and development, determining the status of protected areas, ecology, the preservation of architectural heritage, etc. Less often, when economic interests are clearly represented in representative bodies, the struggle is over budget requisitions, staff in municipal unitary enterprises (MUEs) and municipal institutions, etc. Simply put, it's a struggle for resources, including financial resources.

Question 4. What are the main features of municipal elections that set them apart from state elections?

S.B.Kryzhov

In the LSG deputy elections, one chooses certain representatives, certain people, with little reference to who nominates them.

Ye.L.Rusakova

A candidate has the opportunity to personally meet a large number of voters and actually bring the required number of voters to vote (this does not apply to the case of using the remote e-voting to rig elections).

N.V.Shavshukova

Let me repeat: I consider the division into state authority and some kind of secondary, municipal authority to be flawed. The only benefit of the bill is the very name of "unified system of public authority."

K.V.Kiselyov

Assuming elections are held in constituencies of the same size, there are no process-related differences. Flyers, meetings, media appearances, commercials and other "propaganda" means are all the same. Process-related differences depend on the size of the constituency. If the constituency is small and is located in a small municipality where everyone knows each other, then flyers won't really help. What matters in this case is the reputation — something that is built up over the years. If the constituency is huge, standing at, say, 60 thousand residents, it doesn't really matter what kind of election that is. A local government body election or a legislative assembly election.

One fundamental difference is that the "competent" authorities pay more attention to elections to the state government bodies. This attention most often results in preventing candidates whom the authorities deem undesirable from taking part in these elections.

O.V.Balabanova

A. They are the most outrageous in terms of preventing "unapproved" candidates from coming into office. Why? Appeals get stopped at the regional level, news coverage is insufficient. The situation is entirely under the control of the regional authorities.

B. Better coverage and quality control participating candidates are actually invested in the process (in competitive elections).

C. Face-to-face meetings between candidates and voters dominate the campaign.

L.V.Shapiro

Municipal deputies are closer to the voters, constituencies are smaller in size, and municipal budgets are much poorer. It is much more significant when a municipal deputy takes part in managing the life of a local community than when state deputy takes part in governant activities at the regional or federal level. Therefore, municipal elections should ensure a higher quality of elected deputies.

V.A.Chernikov

If we're talking about whether there is a generic difference between municipal and regional elections and, more so, federal elections, then, yes, there is. In municipal elections, it is the specific people and personalities who are known to a substantial part of the electorate that should be elected. Voter requests for such people address local problems within a constituency or municipality. In state government elections, significance is given to the issues that go beyond the boundaries of a particular municipality. Party programs that focus on long-term development play a big role here. Because there are so many voters in constituencies, whether a voter is personally familiar with a candidate is not that important. The party guarantees that candidates are competent. Besides, they are no longer electing public figures at the federal level, but politicians who are willing to work on a permanent basis.

V.S.Kovin

Given the pragmatic nature of local issues, their clarity and simplicity in comparison to regional and national issues, and the relatively small amount of resources distributed by LSG bodies, local elections must be "simpler" as opposed to national elections, in order to provide access to elections for local politicians who are not the most legally prepared and politically sophisticated. There should be fewer restrictions on the exercise of passive suffrage, fewer formal requirements for candidates and electoral associations, fewer restrictions on campaigning, simplified procedures for counting votes, etc. The most important condition is the self-identification or self-localization of the voter as a member of the local community. This means there is a need for transitioning from "serf" active suffrage "at the place of residence/registration" to "tax" resident suffrage (or other type of resident), meaning ability to vote wherever a person is paying their taxes, manages a production facility or simply resides on a long-term basis. Another way is to give the voter the opportunity to choose the local community that they would like to vote in every five to ten years.

A.F.Cherepanova, K.F.Cherepanova

Turnout in municipal elections is significantly lower than in national elections. This is because voters do not trust local government, believing that it has no influence over any issues. This, in turn, has to do with the state infringing on the rights of LSG bodies and with the lack of funds to ensure the powers of said bodies. The absolute majority of municipalities are artificially subsidized because of defects in the budgetary policy of the Russian Federation, which consists in over-centralization of tax revenues at the federal and regional levels of government. However, instead of filling local budgets with sufficient financial resources by assigning to them economically justified deductions from federal taxes, a mechanism of "redistribution of powers" in favor of state power is in effect.

The second feature of municipal elections, especially at the settlement level, is the plurality voting system. Although there is a 2019 example, where a number of rural settlements in Novgorod Oblast — Yermolinsky, Trubichinsky, Tesovo-Netilsky, and Savinsky — attempted to introduce a proportional representation system. Representatives of five parties got into the Councils of Deputies and the experiment was deemed unsuccessful, because United Russia was unable to achieve high results. In 2021, the deputies of these settlements amended their charters and brought back the plurality voting system.

Question 5. What should be the size of the electoral district or the number of voters in it so that a deputy candidate can meet with all their potential voters?

A.F.Cherepanova, K.F.Cherepanova

No more than 10,000 people.

Ye.L.Rusakova

Physically, a deputy working on a part-time basis can interact with about 1,500 voters, preferably even less than that.

S.B.Kryzhov

1000-3000 people without administrative support. 10,000 when meetings are organized by election commissions (this was the case in 1990–1995).

V.S.Kovin

In large cities, given the density of population — no more than 20 thousand. In small and medium-sized cities — no more than 10 thousand. In rural areas, given the territorial dispersion — no more than 5-7 thousand.

O.V.Balabanova

Even if they involve a big celebrity, like Alla Pugacheva, not everyone is going to show up. In a digital age, a candidate can com municate online with the entire constituency non-stop. Which they do. They can still use their legs, but you need to make people want to come to in-person meetings. Otherwise, you show up to the meeting and the voter doesn't. Depends on the agenda. It may happen that 10,500 people show up. It's a matter of how well the campaign office is doing their job.

N.V.Shavshukova

The maximum amount is 5-6 thousand people, but in large cities with high population density it could be as many as 20 thousand, and in Siberia a constituency of 200 voters might be enough. The ability of LSG bodies to determine their own structure, depending on the nature of the territory (stipulated by the current Federal Law No. 131-FZ) makes absolute sense.

K.V.Kiselyov

It's math. Here's a hypothetical example: a candidate may canvass some 20 apartments per day, the average number of voters in an address is 2.5. Total: 50 people a day. The total number of days is 60. It turns out that a candidate can personally meet with 3,000 voters over the course of two months. That's working to the max. But okay, there are mass meetings, backyard meetings, tea parties. Finally, there are confidants and assistants. Let's add that much more. But it is hardly realistic.

Technology is now aimed at collecting "hot" contacts, which are then kept up to date and "hot" during the entire campaign. In large constituencies, like in Yekaterinburg, you can use all kinds of means to collect over 10,000 contacts with the help of the entire team. This is usually enough to hope for victory.

L.V.Shapiro

There is no need for a candidate and a deputy to meet with all the residents of their constituency. This is wishful thinking. At best, 20-25% of eligible voters are ACTUAL voters. The rest are simply not interested in elections as a whole.

V.A.Chernikov

A. First, we need to understand why a candidate needs to meet with ALL the voters. The need for this is far from obvious, and it is not at all possible in government elections. Then, we need to clarify if it is going to be a one-time meeting or a series of meetings during the deputy's term in office.

B. If we are talking about the municipal level and plurality voting system, we can suggest the following. In terms of the number of voters, a constituency should be such that the deputy would potentially be able to visit every family during their term of office. At the same time, the number of voters for a three-year term will be lower than for a five-year term. What matters here is not so much the deputy's physical meetings with families, as the feeling of the deputy's accessibility to the voters.

Question 6. Which electoral systems are optimal for municipal elections at different levels?

O.V.Balabanova

The whole range should be represented, and the choice is up to the people. Multi-seat systems are better when election fraud is present. They are more difficult to rig.

Ye.L.Rusakova

A mixed system.

N.V.Shavshukova

The experience of other countries shows that introducing a proportional representation system increases the influence of federal parties, but at the same time smoothes out local populism. For small municipalities, multi-seat constituencies are sufficient, but in cities over 100,000, the use of a mixed or even a proportional representation system is inevitable. At the same time, local blocs and associations to must be allowed to participate in municipal elections.

A.F.Cherepanova, K.F.Cherepanova

A mixed compensatory system, where half of the deputies are elected from single-seat constituencies and half from party lists. It is necessary to keep the party lists, especially at the level of urban and municipal districts (raions). Abolishing party lists gives an advantage to United Russia — the ruling party — which forms (together with the administration) a single body that pursues policies in the interests of state power. Uniformity and conformity of ideas prevents the development of alternative ideas and proposals, effectively eliminating representation of citizen interests and subordinating the representative body to the executive branch.

But what is needed is a mixed compensatory system, like the one in Germany. This means that the total number of seats a party receives is determined by the percentage of the vote for the lists. This approach considers political preferences of different voter groups and does not distort the expression of the will at the expense of seats gained in constituencies.

S.B.Kryzhov

A plurality voting system only. Single-seat constituencies, as a rule Multi-seat constituencies are viable only in established densely populated neighborhoods. There is no need to combine the areas that into multi-seat constituencies.

From my own experience, the most optimal way of forming LSG took place in 1990. Single-seat elections on a two-round system with constituencies of about 1,000 voters. A representative body that forms an affiliated executive and, if necessary, a permanent representative body from among its own members. This body hold most powers over current matters except the charter, budget, election and termination of agencies, appointment of a referendum, approval of the general plan and some other important decisions.

L.V.Shapiro

The quality of municipal deputies can be improved through creating opportunities for a wider choice among candidates, namely by holding elections in multi-seat constituencies. This increases the representation of voters' interests because: 1) each voter has not one but several deputies to choose the one most suitable for them; 2) multi-seat constituencies break the monopoly of one party, which stimulates the activity of the representative body. The electoral process gets cheaper as well, because if one of the candidates drops out, there is no need to hold early elections, since the constituency is represented by the candidate's colleagues.

Moreover, multi-seat constituencies are correspondingly larger in size. This gives an elected deputy the opportunity to address real issues of improving residential areas (neighborhoods, townships), rather than chipping away at the budget for his/her 10 houses from a fellow deputy who has his 10 houses in the neighboring yard.

Party list elections in municipalities barely seem effectual, since party organizations in cities are too weak to actually take part in addressing local issues and, therefore, to participate in elections in any meaningful way.

V.S.Kovin

Local elections are even more personalized than regional and federal elections. Voters are more likely to be personally acquainted with the candidates and can rely on their personal preferences and assessments rather than on ideological party preferences and group interests. Therefore, the voter should be given more room to maneuver, more freedom of choice, more variability for voting. Ideally, one should move toward systems that give the voter more than one vote (for example, like cumulative voting in some states in Germany, where the voter has as many votes as there are to-be-filled seats on the local council), ranking candidates in order of preference (preferential systems).

In large cities, in administrative centers, in municipal raions, urban and municipal okrugs, it is necessary to provide for some or other options for party list nominations, but with the mandatory provision of personalized voting on them (open lists, panachage).

It is also necessary to take into account that in local elections, voting "locally" is one of the dominant motivations for the voter. Therefore, when municipal raions, urban and municipal okrugs are split into constituencies, it is necessary to take into account the former or current settlement structure of the territory, especially in rural areas. The splitting process should be organized in such a way that the competition goes on for the votes in a particular local community and for the seat(s) assigned to their settlement. When territories of different settlements are included in a constituency (when the number of seats at stake is less than the number of settlements included in the constituency), the outcome of the election is often predetermined in advance by the numerical ratio of the residents of those settlements. Otherwise, it is highly likely that entire local communities in rural areas, albeit small in number and occupying large territories, will fall out of the political space, especially with the elimination of the lower level of LSG.

K.V.Kiselyov

What is an optimal system? Who assesses optimality? This is the first set of questions. Relatively speaking, the current "disgracefully ruling" government [5] has no need for an election at all. For staunch ideologues of meritocracy, certain standards (educational, etc.) clearly look desirable [3; 8; 14].

What is the aspect of municipality that we are dealing with? Is it the number of residents? Is it economic self-sufficiency? Is it the existence of active communities? This is the second set of questions. For example, in certain small municipalities, it is essentially impossible to find a person who would be willing to lead that municipality or who would meet the professional criteria. And very often the issue is in fact resolved through the system of hired/appointed manager. In other municipalities, like Yekaterinburg, the issue is resolved through elections only.

It seems that the two main criteria for the electoral system's optimality are: 1) its ability to ensure the representation of the widest spectrum of interests; 2) the expertise and professionalism of the deputies. Both can be achieved in many different ways in different municipalities.

V.A.Chernikov

A. The proportional representation system that uses open or free lists is optimal for all levels of municipal elections. In large municipalities, the party component will be more significant in such elections, while in medium-sized and small municipalities it is the personal component that is going to prevail. But this is how it works ideally.

B. In reality, local issues with streets, neighborhoods and districts remain unresolved in the overwhelming majority of large municipalities until this day, and will remain so for years to come. Having a "local" as a deputy in the constituency under such circumstances is significantly more important to the voter than having a "local" party in the municipality as a whole. Therefore, it seems more logical to use the plurality voting system with the absolute majority for municipal elections in single-seat constituencies in the near future while taking into account the optimal number of voters in the district (see the answer to Question 5).

C. The exceptions would be the municipalities where the number of voters as a whole does not allow the creation of separate constituencies that meet the principle of optimality. For example, if the law establishes a minimum number of seven deputies and a minimum term of three years, then it is more fitting to hold elections in a single multi-seat constituency by the plurality voting system of absolute majority in municipalities with fewer than 5-7 thousand voters. In this case, however, it is necessary to legally ensure that any voter has the right to appeal to any deputy with an issue, and that the deputy is obligated to accept such appeals.

D. In any case, the option to use other electoral systems should be left to the extent that there are sufficient objective grounds for doing so. The list of such grounds has to be worked out separately.

Question 7. Should the participation of all-Russian parties in municipal elections be encouraged? Is there a need for local (town hall) parties in municipal elections?

A.F.Cherepanova, K.F.Cherepanova

Yes, it should and there is. Party diversity in the representative bodies of LSG gives an idea of political preferences of voters and allows for a fuller consideration of different opinions in solving local issues.

N.V.Shavshukova

Of course, local associations are needed. In fact, they exist even now — these are cross-party alliances around environmental and urban planning issues.

L.V.Shapiro

It is desirable for all social forces to participate in municipal elections in order to nominate "their" candidates — be it individuals or entire lists. At present, only all-Russian parties participate in elections in this way, and there is a great lack of local parties, local public organizations, electoral blocs, etc.

V.A.Chernikov

Anything that can increase voter interest in participating in elections should be encouraged. "Town hall" parties, public associations, and electoral blocs should certainly be allowed to participate in elections. Any activity in this direction will work to the benefit of a quality local government emerging.

K.V.Kiselyov

The greater the segmentation of the intermediary structures, the more diverse and complete the representation of interests will be. Therefore, all kinds of parties — federal, regional, "town hall" — are a good thing when elections are fair. Another thing is that fair elections are not the case nowadays. But even today, any intrigue, any competition is strategically good for the municipality.

Ye.L.Rusakova

Under normal circumstances, participation of all parties is a good thing. The participation of federal-level parties draws in voters interested in "big politics" and increases turnout. It may also help opposition candidates pass. In the current situation, when the possibility of registering new democratic and liberal parties is blocked, and existing parties are under pressure to nominate candidates "approved" by the authorities, it is still difficult to imagine the possibility of registering local parties. It would be an interesting option, however.

O.V.Balabanova

The parties are quite motivated (municipal filter, the opportunity to have guaranteed seats in election commissions, etc.). There should be many forms for subjects of nomination. This increases competition and benefits the community, whether it is a local party or a public association whose charters include election participation.

V.S.Kovin

There is no need to encourage the participation of federal parties in any special way. It is necessary to encourage the creation of voter associations and the creation of local ("town hall") parties, to encourage the participation of local nonpartisan public associations in local elections. Feeling the "threat" and the competition, the large federal parties will come to local elections themselves.

S.B.Kryzhov

There has been enough encouragement for federal parties to participate in municipal elections, especially through representatives in election commissions who have the deciding vote. This also led to an infestation of election fraud professionals. It is the citizens who should form election commissions in municipal elections. More rights should be given to public associations in local elections. Participation guarantees should be provided to self-nominated candidates. Local parties are an incomprehensible concept in Russia. We need to encourage the creation of voter associations, which happened spontaneously in 1989–1990.

Question 8. Is it a good practice when municipal deputies are elected to the bodies of state power, when they "climb higher" in the system of public authority? Is it not better for effective management to avoid mixing municipal politics with regional and federal politics?

A.F.Cherepanova, K.F.Cherepanova

There is nothing wrong with politicians growing and transitioning from the municipal level to the state power level. On the contrary, it is good when a deputy goes through this kind of "school": dealing with local problems first, and after gaining experience, getting elected to regional and federal government bodies.

N.V.Shavshukova

Mixing different levels of politics is inevitable, and the system must be flexible enough to provide opportunities for local and regional blocs and parties.

O.V.Balabanova

Effective management begins where there is competition and freedom of choice. Any deputy can nominate themselves wherever they want. And if they win, they can represent the voters who entrusted them with their votes.

V.A.Chernikov

If properly organized, municipal government is a good school for politicians and managers who intend to devote themselves to serving the public and the state. Not everyone will end up choosing this path to build their future career. But the very awareness of regional and federal politicians of local problems, the ability to identify and solve them in the interests of voters can significantly change the political landscape at the regional and federal levels.

S.B.Kryzhov

The division of politics into levels is conditional. I believe this practice is more good than it is not. I am like that myself. Pros: no stage of mastering the methodology of decision-making by the representative body, experience in solving on-the-ground issues and knowledge of the structure of power is required.

It is impossible to ban municipal deputies from trying to get elected to the bodies of state power, so there is no point in arguing about it.

V.S.Kovin

It is one of the political freedoms, and in no way should it be restricted. Without the "right to a political career", we will never have a strata of professional politicians. Starting your political career at the local level would therefore be a good idea. Moreover, having local experience ought to give electoral benefits if a politician decides to run for the State Duma or a regional legislative assembly (for example, the number of required signatures should be reduced or there should be no need to collect them whatsoever). Regional and federal politicians must constantly feel that municipal politicians are breathing down their necks. Encouraging the participation of municipal politicians in higher-level elections would create the conditions for real lobbying of LSG interests in state bodies.

Ye.L.Rusakova

Political activity at the municipal level can be a good start for an aspiring politician.

According to my observations, municipal deputies are more reasonable and effective, since they perceive their actions as political and tie it to a certain ideology and principles. Those who are convinced that there is "no politics yet" at this level and try to solve minor economic problems are more likely to be fickle, unprincipled, to be "corrupted" by the executive branch and stop acting in the interests of their voters.

A municipal deputy has a direct line to his/her voters, gaining experience in leadership, initiatives, perception of the needs and requirements of citizens, assisting with their self-organization. These are useful skills for political activity at any level.

L.V.Shapiro

Municipal deputies "climbing the career ladder" is not just a positive development — it is an absolutely necessary element of shaping a country's political elite.

The local level is where a person tests his/her capabilities and aspirations, gains experience working with voters and executive branch officials, and begins to understand the real issues. A municipal deputy gets firsthand experience of the shortcomings of the law and the practice of public administration. Understanding what needs to be changed, he/she moves to the regional level and gains relevant experience there. And by and large, only after that can he/she be admitted as a federal deputy or, for example, as a governor.

K.V.Kiselyov

Career aspirations are a normal thing. Politics is a profession. Growth is a natural and necessary part of any profession. At the same time, there should be an understanding that it is nearly impossible to do anything useful at the regional level. The vast majority of Russian regions are land scorched to the grass roots with napalm. The deputies, who actually worked at the municipal level and left for higher offices, speak of this with sadness and out of public view.

Received 27.02.2022, revised received 9.03.2022.

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