Mixed Non-Compensatory Electoral System with a Predominant Majority Component in Regional and Municipal Elections in Russia

Lyubarev A.E.

Abstract

This article examines the application of the mixed non-compensatory electoral system with a predominant majority component in Russia’s regional parliamentary and municipal elections. It provides a brief overview of the history of this system’s use in Russia. The study notes that the model with a predominant majority component was the main one in regional elections from 1993 to 2002, when the mixed system was used rarely and experimentally, while between 2003 and 2013 this model was prohibited for regional elections. Its broad implementation in municipal elections began in 2014, and in regional elections in 2019. Since then, regional parliamentary elections using the mixed system with a predominant majority component have been held 26 times across 21 regions, and 51 times across 27 regional centers. The article demonstrates that the leading party (LDPR in one case, United Russia in all others) secures a larger (often significantly larger) share of seats than its share of the popular vote. This outcome is achieved primarily through the majority component, while in the party-list component the leading party often shows no advantage, particularly in cases where ten seats are distributed among lists. The paper identifies a correlation between the share of votes received by the leading party’s list and the share of single-seat constituencies it wins. The model frequently results in a "manufactured majority" – a situation where a party gains the majority of seats with less than half of the votes: 46% of regional elections and 63% of municipal elections display this pattern.

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History of the mixed system in Russia

The mixed non-compensatory (parallel) electoral system has been used in Russia since December 1993. In the State Duma elections that took place in 1993–2021, it was used in six out of eight electoral cycles (with the exception of 2007 and 2011). In regional elections, it was also first applied in December 1993, but until mid-2003 it was used infrequently (only 10 electoral campaigns in 8 regions). However, from December 2003 the use of party lists became mandatory. At the same time, a fully proportional representation system was applied in a small number of regions, and the number of such regions has declined in recent years. After 2003, a fully majority voting system in Russian regions was used only in Moscow starting in 2014 (when the law introduced an exception for federal cities). In 2022, federal legislation removed the requirement for mandatory party lists in regional elections; however, over the following three years, no region utilized this option. Overall, from 2003 to 2025, the mixed system was employed in 346 campaigns across nearly all regions, with the exceptions of the Republic of Dagestan, two abolished autonomous okrugs, and regions annexed in 2022.

At the municipal level, the mixed system was used only in Krasnoyarsk Krai before 2004. It was then gradually adopted in other regions. Between 2011 and 2013, party lists were mandatory in municipal raions (districts) and urban okrugs with at least 20 deputies, and the mixed system was widely applied in large cities, including regional centers. Its use began to decline after 2014; nonetheless, it continues to be employed in many regional centers.

International practice knows various versions of the mixed non-compensatory system, which differ in the characteristics of the list and majority components [11: 207–209]. In the Russian context, the list component always consists of a single nationwide (or region-wide) constituency and closed party lists (often, but by no means always, divided into territorial groups). In the majority component, single-seat constituencies and the plurality system (relative majority system) are used in most cases; the use of the absolute majority system has occurred only once (Republic of North Ossetia–Alania), and cases involving multi-seat constituencies are rare. All electoral campaigns analysed in this article (with the exception of Murmansk in 2014, where two-seat constituencies were formed) used single-seat constituencies and the plurality system.

In elections to the State Duma, the ratio between the list and majority components has always been equal, although the presidential administration has on several occasions attempted to secure the predominance of the majority component. In regional elections in 1993–2002, the majority component predominated in all eight regions, although in Krasnoyarsk Krai the ratio between the majority and list components was close (22:20), while in the other seven regions the majority component clearly dominated (from 2:1 in Pskov Oblast and Koryak AO to 27:5 in Kaliningrad Oblast and the Ust-Orda Buryat AO).

From 2003 to 2013, federal legislation required that the list component in regional elections account for at least half of all seats. As a result, models with a predominant majority component were not permitted. In 2013, this requirement was softened (the list component was required to account for at least 25%), and in 2022 it was abolished altogether. Until 2019, only two regions made use of this alleviation, and only to reduce the list component by a single seat relative to the majority component (we do not classify such cases as models with a predominant majority component). Since 2019, models with a predominance of the majority component have begun to be applied in regional elections. Though not universally, they have been used quite extensively: over seven years, they were employed in 26 campaigns across 21 regions, with five regions applying them twice.

In elections for representative bodies of regional centers between 2005 and 2011, the ratio of majority to list components was typically equal or roughly equal. Exceptions where the majority component predominated included Nizhny Novgorod (28:14) in 2005 and 2010, and Vladimir (28:7) in March 2011. Between 2011 and 2013, federal law prohibited models with a predominance of the majority component. From 2014 onward, these models were again permitted and became widely used: over 12 years, they were implemented in 51 campaigns across 27 regional centers, with 8 centers using them twice and another 8 using them three times [5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10].

This study analyzes the use of models with a predominance of the majority component in regional elections from 2019 to 2025 and in elections for representative bodies of regional centers from 2014 to 2025.

Features of the mixed non-compensatory system

When a mixed non-compensatory system was introduced in Russia and several other countries, it was expected to combine the advantages of both majority and proportional systems. In practice, however, it has been shown to combine not only the strengths but also the weaknesses of these systems. In particular, one advantage of the proportional system is that parties receive seats in proportion to the votes cast for them. By contrast, the majority system is characterized by a substantial discrepancy between the share of votes received by parties and the share of seats they obtain. While a mixed compensatory system (as used in Germany, New Zealand, and elsewhere) preserves this important advantage of the proportional system, the mixed non-compensatory system tends to exhibit the aforementioned disadvantage of the majority system, albeit to a lesser degree [2; 11: 203–234].

One of the most striking manifestations of the discrepancy between vote shares and election outcomes is the "manufactured" majority effect, which frequently occurs under a majority system and fairly often under a mixed non-compensatory system. This effect arises when a party that receives less than half of the votes secures more than half of the seats. The will of the electorate is therefore distorted, as the voters do not grant the party the authority to make laws or other important decisions unilaterally [4; 17: 74–77, 92, 179].

Between December 2003 and October 2012, when the ratio of majority to list components was generally equal, a "manufactured" majority occurred in 51 out of 173 regional election campaigns, and in 17 out of 52 campaigns in regional centers [14]. From December 2003 to September 2022, we identified 137 instances of "manufactured" majorities in regional elections [6: 472–475].

The policy of Russian legislators on electoral systems

Russian legislative policy on electoral systems lacked consistency, though its changes followed discernible patterns. From 1993 to 2002, State Duma elections employed a mixed non-compensatory system with an equal division between majority and list components. In regional elections, the choice of electoral system was entirely left to the regions, while in municipal elections it was only partly under the control of local self-government bodies and largely influenced by regional legislators. During this period, the mixed system was adopted in regional elections by only a few regions, primarily as an experimental measure and mostly just once, whereas at the municipal level its use was limited to Krasnoyarsk Krai.

In most regions and municipalities, the relative-majority system (plurality system) predominated, which did little to promote the development of political parties. In most constituencies, candidates who succeeded were "strong managers" or professionals with close ties to the public (social workers, medical workers, and teachers), who had little or no party affiliation [3]. This situation continued until a unified "party of power" emerged with adequate electoral support.

In 2002, federal law – prompted by the factions of the CPRF, the Union of Right Forces, and Yabloko, with neutral or passive support from the "Unity" and "Fatherland – All Russia" factions and the CEC of Russia – introduced a requirement that at least half of regional parliaments be elected via a proportional representation system. From December 2003 to October 2006, the mixed system was in effect in nearly all regions. At the municipal level, the mixed system remained uncommon until fall 2005, extending beyond the cities of Krasnoyarsk Krai to just one additional municipal unit in Chita Oblast [5; 7; 9].

In 2005, legislation was passed to shift to a fully proportional system for State Duma elections. Experts understood, however, that the mixed non-compensatory system was more favorable to United Russia than a fully proportional system, as it secured a greater share of seats in single-seat constituencies than via party lists. We argue that the decision was taken by the Presidential Executive Office in its own interests, aimed at enhancing the manageability of the parliamentary corps, in part due to the impending transition of Vladimir Putin from president to Prime Minister [7: 545–548].

However, this transition spurred a pattern of imitation across a number of regions. From March 2007 to March 2010, 11 regions conducted elections using a fully proportional representation system [7: 598; 12; 16]. Simultaneously, both the mixed system and the fully proportional system began to be implemented in municipal elections [7: 607–612; 13].

The year 2011 marked a turning point. In March, a federal law was passed requiring that at least half of the representative bodies of municipal formations with 20 or more deputies be elected through a proportional system. By July, however, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation declared proportional elections in small rural settlements unconstitutional [13]. This initiated a reversal. Of the 11 regions that had previously adopted a fully proportional system, seven abandoned it over the next decade, while two additional regions adopted it, leaving the fully proportional system currently in use only in six republics of the Caucasus region. In 2013, the next step was the complete removal of requirements to use the proportional representation system in municipalities and federal cities, along with a reduction of the mandatory list component to 25% in other regions. Finally, in 2022, the requirement to use the proportional system in regional elections was entirely abolished, though in practice no region other than Moscow has exercised this option. At the same time, as noted earlier, the list component in regional elections began to decrease. For State Duma elections, a law reintroducing the mixed system was passed in 2014 [6: 115–117, 126–127, 264, 380, 386–387].

These developments, known as "departization" [8], resulted from decreasing support for United Russia. The first decline occurred in 2011 in the State Duma elections and in 2013 in regional elections, which led to the reintroduction of the mixed system in Duma elections, a reduction of the mandatory list component in regional elections, and the abolition of the requirement to use proportional representation in municipal elections. Later, the events in Crimea boosted support for the "party of power," preventing any reduction of the list component in regional elections at that time. The second decline took place in 2018, amid unpopular social reforms, when regions began to exercise the option granted by the 2013 law.

The question remains: why did United Russia not fully eliminate the proportional component in regional elections and certain municipal elections, opting instead to retain a mixed system with a reduced list share? The likely explanation is that such a system offers considerable advantages for the "party of power." The majority component, ranging from 57% to 80%, secures a legislative majority even when voter support is moderate. Meanwhile, the list component enables a unified campaign and allows the use of the "locomotive" technique, where a prominent regional figure or other popular candidate heads the list without intending to assume office. Moreover, maintaining the list component can be interpreted as a concession to the systemic opposition in return for its loyalty.

These mechanisms are illustrated in the case of regional and municipal elections conducted under mixed system with a predominant majority component.

Regional elections, 2019–2025

Between 2019 and 2025, elections using the model with a predominant majority component took place 26 times across 21 regions, with five regions holding such elections twice. These instances are summarized in Table 1. The proportion of the majority component ranged from 62.5% in Vladimir and Novgorod Oblasts to 75% in the Republic of Mari El, Primorsky Krai, and Saratov Oblast.

As shown, in every case the leader’s overall seat share was higher than their vote share. The smallest gap (8.4%) was observed in Lipetsk Oblast, and the largest (42.4%) in Novgorod Oblast. In 11 instances, the gap exceeded 30%.

In all cases, the leader’s total seat share surpassed 50%, with a minimum of 54.8% in Lipetsk Oblast. Nevertheless, in 12 campaigns the leader gained less than 50% of the votes. These 12 instances therefore represent cases of a "manufactured" majority.

Elections to representative bodies of regional centers, 2014–2025

Between 2014 and 2025, elections under models with a predominant majority component took place 51 times in 27 regional centers, with 8 centers conducting such elections twice and another 8 three times. These instances are summarized in Table 2. The proportion of the majority component ranged from 57% in Tula to 80% in Novosibirsk.

As shown, in every case the leader’s overall seat share was higher than their vote share. The smallest gap (5.2%) occurred in Tomsk in 2020, and the largest (44.5%) in Smolensk in the same year. In 28 cases (i.e., more than half) the gap exceeded 30%.

In all cases but one (Tomsk in 2020), the leader’s total seat share exceeded 50%. Meanwhile, in 32 campaigns (63%), the leader obtained less than 50% of the votes. These 32 cases therefore represent instances of a "manufactured" majority.

Seat allocation between party lists

Let us now examine the election results as a whole – covering all 77 campaigns analyzed. As noted earlier, the leading party’s share of seats tends to considerably exceed its share of votes. Yet this difference arises from two distinct components: the difference within the list component and that within the majority component.

Let us take the list component for a start. As we can see, no uniform trend is apparent. In 62 cases, the leader’s share of list seats surpasses its vote share, while in 15 cases it falls below. In 14 additional cases, the difference is minor – under 5% – indicating that the two figures are relatively close, given that an exact match is practically impossible. To put it differently, only in 48 out of 77 cases is the difference substantial, exceeding 5%.

We know that in nearly all regions, seats are allocated using either the Imperiali divisor method or the Tyumen method, both of which favor the leading party [6: 387; 11: 277–285; 15]. Yet this advantage appears in no more than one-third of all cases.

To explore the reasons for this, let us consider how the difference correlates with the number of seats allocated among party lists. Some general statistics first: in one case (Amur Oblast), 9 seats were allocated; in 43 cases, 10 seats; in 17 cases, 11–12 seats; in 13 cases, 13–16 seats; in two cases (the Udmurt Republic and Rostov Oblast), 20 seats; and in one case (Krasnodar Krai), 25 seats.

Table 3 illustrates how the differences depend on the number of allocated seats. It is evident that most negative differences occur when 10 seats are allocated, whereas for 13 or more seats no such cases are observed. At the same time, when 13–16 seats are allocated, the difference exceeds 10% in almost half of the cases, and for 20 and 25 seats it exceeds 10% in all three instances.

The explanation for this is fairly straightforward. The law requires that any party passing the 5% threshold must receive at least one seat. If only ten seats are allocated and six parties cross the threshold, the leading party simply cannot obtain more than five seats. For instance, in Kostroma Oblast in 2025, six parties entered the regional Duma. United Russia, with 50.3% of the vote, won five seats, while each of the remaining five parties received one seat. The Imperiali method prescribed by the regional law could not have helped United Russia secure additional seats – there were simply none available.

If the second-place party receives two seats, then with ten seats in total, the leader can get no more than five seats when five parties pass the threshold (as is now most common), and no more than four when six parties do. For instance, in Penza in 2024, United Russia received 65.8% of the vote but secured only five seats, as two went to the CPRF and one each to three other parties.

Consequently, reducing the number of list seats to ten often deprives United Russia of the opportunity to gain a "bonus" in the list component of the representative body. However, this loss is compensated by an additional "bonus" derived from the majority component.

Seats won by parties in single-seat constituencies

With respect to the leading party’s results in single-seat constituencies, the pattern is quite straightforward. In all 77 cases, the party obtained a higher share of seats in constituencies than its share of votes received by the list. And – with one exception – a higher share than in the list component itself.

The exception was Tomsk in 2020, where the leading party achieved its lowest result (24.5%) and where the opposition succeeded in implementing the "smart voting" strategy. As a consequence, United Russia secured three of ten list seats (30%) and eight of 27 constituency seats (29.6%) [1]. Its overall share of seats amounted to 29.7%, only 5.2% higher than its share of votes.

Certain cases may also be considered exceptional: Lipetsk Oblast (2021), Krasnodar Krai and Saratov Oblast (2022), Rostov Oblast (2023), and Krasnodar (2025), where the differences were relatively small. In Krasnodar, for instance, United Russia received 63.4% of the vote and secured 9 of 13 list seats (69.2%) and only 30 of 39 constituency seats (76.9%), meaning the difference relative to the vote share amounted to 13.5%, and that to the share of list seats to 7.7%. However, in all nine constituencies where candidates from other parties or independents won, United Russia nominees were absent: either because they did not file for registration or withdrew after registration. In other words, these constituencies were deliberately conceded to the opposition.

In all remaining 71 cases, the difference between the share of constituencies won by the leading party and its share of votes exceeded 22%, while the difference relative to its share of list seats exceeded 15%. The maximum discrepancy with the vote share (62.8%) was observed in Smolensk in 2020, and the maximum difference relative to the share of list seats (66.7%) occurred in Amur Oblast in 2021. In 12 cases (16%), the leading party won 100% of the single-seat constituencies. In this respect, the LDPR in Khabarovsk Krai in 2019 does not differ fundamentally from United Russia in other cases: its difference relative to the vote share was 35.6%, and relative to the list seat share was 25.0%.

An earlier analysis examined the relationship between the leading party’s electoral performance and the share of majority seats it obtained. That analysis was also based on data from Russian regional and municipal elections conducted under the mixed non-compensatory system. At that time, however, the proportions of list and majority seats were generally equal or nearly equal. The following conclusions were drawn: "The plurality voting system, when used as a component of a mixed system, has the property of granting an absolute majority of seats to a party that enjoys only a relative majority of voter support... It is therefore useful to examine the relationship between voter support for United Russia in the single constituency and the share of seats obtained by this party in majority constituencies. The correlation coefficient between these indicators turned out to be rather low (0.26), although significant at the 5% level... Therefore, it can be concluded that when the leading party­ receives 40–50% of the votes in the single constituency, it almost invariably achieves a 'manufactured majority' wherever the mixed system is used. With voter support between 35% and 40%, the likelihood of a 'manufactured majority' also remains quite high; at 30–35%, it is substantially lower; and when support falls below 30%, the occurrence of a 'manufactured majority' becomes unlikely” [14].

We can now conduct a similar analysis for cases in which the majority component predominates. This time, the correlation coefficient is higher, at 0.47. The relationship between the two variables is best illustrated in Table 4.

As we can observe, when the leading party’s support is below 40%, in half of the cases it obtains fewer than 80% of the majority seats. There were no instances of winning 100% of the majority seats within this range. At support levels of 40–50%, most cases involve winning 90–97% of the majority seats, although instances of winning 100% also occur. When support exceeds 50%, there are no cases in which fewer than 70% of majority seats are won, and occurrences in the 70–80% range are rare.

Notably, the relationship is nonlinear. In the 35–40% support range, a greater proportion of cases yield fewer than 70% of majority seats than in the 25–35% range. In the 60–70% range, there are instances of winning 70–80% of majority seats, whereas no such cases appear in the 50–60% range. Moreover, the proportion of cases with 100% wins in the 60–70% range is lower than in the 50–60% range (one-quarter versus one-third). This pattern appears to reflect the strategic behavior of the "party of power". At low levels of list support (which can be reliably anticipated) the party concentrates its main efforts on single-seat constituencies, recruiting strong candidates, preventing strong opposition candidates from competing, and intensively mobilizing supporters. In contrast, at high levels of support, the "party of power" is willing to concede a few constituencies to the opposition deliberately.

Conclusion

The results of our study confirm the well-established view that for a leading party with electoral support above 30–35%, a majority system is more advantageous than a proportional one. This explains why, over the past decade in Russia, there has been a shift from mixed systems toward a majority system in Moscow and many large cities, as well as a reduction of the list component in favor of the majority component in numerous regions and regional centers.

At the same time, a mixed non-compensatory system with a predomint majority component often proves even more convenient for the "party of power" than a merely majority one. The majority component of such a mixed system guarantees it a majority of seats even at relatively low levels of support (around 35–40%), while the party retains the ability to conduct a unified campaign, employ the "locomotive" strategy, and avoid overt problems with opposition representation (which remains substantially below what would be warranted by voter support).

The losers under this system are not only opposition parties, but voters as well. Under this arrangement, a "manufactured majority" emerges in 46% of regional election campaigns. In the remaining cases, the leading party does in fact receive majority support from voters. In regional centers, where support for United Russia is typically lower [6: 479], a "manufactured majority" occurs in a majority of cases (63%).

In effect, this system distorts the will of voters, who in most cases do not grant the leading party a mandate for unilateral decision-making. Yet this is precisely what the "party of power" seeks to achieve through the design of electoral legislation: the preservation of its monopoly on decision-making regardless of the level of electoral support.

Received 26.09.2025, revision received 29.09.2025.

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