No More "Overhang Seats" in the Bundestag: Did Germany’s Electoral Reform Work?

Lyubarev A.E.

Abstract

The paper analyzes the results of the 2025 German Bundestag elections in the context of the preceding electoral reform, which abolished "overhang seats" ("excessive" and "leveling" seats). The author examines the history of Bundestag elections and the controversies surrounding "overhang seats", the 2023 electoral reform, and its subsequent revision by the Constitutional Court. The study concludes that the reform’s objectives were largely achieved: the Bundestag’s size was successfully stabilized while preserving proportional representation. At the same time, the paper highlights challenges that persist in the Bundestag elections, such as an excessively high electoral threshold, unrepresented single-seat constituencies, and potential adjustments to the mixed-member proportional system to fully realize its advantages.

---

In elections to the German Bundestag, a two-vote mixed-member proportional system has been in operation (known as personalized proportional representation in Germany itself) starting from 1953 (that is, from the second election). Over the past 70 years, the electoral rules have been modified several times, but the fundamental nature of this system has remained unchanged. This fundamental nature includes several provisions:

1) The voter has two votes: the first one is cast for a candidate in a single-seat constituency, while the second one is cast for a federal-state party list.

2) In single-seat constituencies, the elected candidate is the one who receives a relative majority of votes.

3) Only party lists that receive over 5% of votes nationwide qualify for seat allocation (there are exceptions to this rule).

4) The total number of seats allocated to each party must be proportional to the number of votes received by parties nationwide.

5) Seats are first awarded to winners in single-seat constituencies, with remaining seats filled by candidates from party lists according to their list position and the party's performance in each individual federal state.

Therefor, this system, on the one hand, ensures proportional distribution of seats, while on the other hand, seats are first allocated to candidates who received direct voter support [5; 7: 213–223; 9; 11; 13].

Until the most recent election, one of the notable features of the German system was the possibility (frequently realized) of increasing the number of Bundestag seats beyond the legally established quantity ("overhang seats"). Until 2013, these were "overhang seats" [2; 12], whose origin will be discussed later in the analysis. In 2013, 2017, and 2021, "leveling seats" began to be added to the "overhang seats" to more precisely ensure proportional representation [7: 222-223; 9]. This started causing a significant increase in the size of the Bundestag, and the existence of "overhang seats" became subject to criticism. As a result, in 2023 the law was amended, abolishing the possibility of "overhang seats". The mechanism for implementing this abolition involved adjusting the rules for determining winners in single-seat constituencies: in some constituencies, it became possible to have no elected candidate [3; 10].

In fact, the 2023 reform proved to be the most radical in 70 years. That said, the Bundestag elections held on February 23, 2025 require analysis to see how this reform has worked. The purpose of this article is to provide such an analysis.

How "overhang seats" originate

Let us examine the mechanism of "overhang seats" coming into origin using the 2021 Bundestag election as an example. In that election (like in the 2013 and 2017 elections), the seat allocation rules were as follows. First, the statutory 598 Bundestag seats (the legally established size) were distributed among the German states proportionally to population size (using the Sainte-Laguë method). Specifically, this allocation granted 127 seats to North Rhine-Westphalia, 93 seats to Bavaria, 20 seats to Brandenburg, 7 seats to Saarland, 5 seats to Bremen, etc.

Then in each federal state, this number of seats was distributed proportionally according to voters' second votes among parties that qualified for seat allocation. Specifically, in Brandenburg, the 20 seats were distributed as follows: 7 to Social Democrats (SPD), 4 to Alternative for Germany (AfD), 3 to Christian Democrats (CDU), 2 to Free Democrats (FDP), 2 to Greens, 2 to Left Party.

Next, the number of seats allocated to each party in a given state was compared with the number of direct seats won by that party (i.e., the number of single-seat constituencies it had secured). It could happen that the latter number exceeded the former. In 2021, this occurred with the SPD in six federal states: Schleswig-Holstein (6 allocated and 8 won), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (4 and 6), Lower Saxony (21 and 22), Brandenburg (7 and 10), Hesse (13 and 14), and Saarland (3 and 4). Across these six states, the total difference amounted to 10 seats. Since the law until recently did not permit stripping parties of their won direct seats, these seats became "overhang seats," thereby increasing the Bundestag's total seat count by this number. In 2021, this resulted in 34 such seats: 10 for SPD, 12 for CDU, 11 for CSU, and 1 for AfD [1].

Until 2009, these "excessive seats" constituted what we refer to as "overhang seats". Their appearance led to some (minor, barely noticeable) distortion of proportional representation. However, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court deemed even such minimal distortions unacceptable and demanded legislative correction [2; 12]. As a result, "leveling seats" were introduced in 2013; they were allocated to parties to restore perfect proportionality. And their number significantly exceeded the number of "excessive seats". Specifically, in 2021, 104 "leveling seats" had to be added to 34 "excessive seats," increasing the Bundestag's total membership to 736 [1].

History of the Bundestag elections

Table 1 presents data on Bundestag elections held between 1953 and 2021. Here we must clarify that while the CDU and CSU are formally separate parties, in this context we choose to treat them as a single party or, more precisely, as a unified bloc (CDU/CSU). From a substantive viewpoint, this approach is more accurate since the CSU only nominates candidates and lists in Bavaria, while the CDU operates in all other states except Bavaria; moreover, both parties form a coalition in the Bundestag.

The table shows that over its 70-year history, only once (in 1957) did one party (CDU/CSU) win an absolute majority of both votes and seats. In all other cases, no party secured the majority of votes, which required it to form a coalition (and the leading party did not always lead the coalition). While the leading party typically received a bonus (meaning its share of seats exceeded its share of votes) this never resulted in a "manufactured majority," that is, a single party gaining over half the seats [7: 118, 219]. In most cases, the bonus did not exceed 3 pp. Twice (in 1990 and 2009) it ranged between 4.4–4.6 pp, and only once (in 2013) did it reach 7.9 pp. As a result, the situation that year came close to a "manufactured majority" (the CDU/CSU bloc held 49.4% of seats with 41.5% of votes).

This bonus results from two factors. The first factor is the exclusion of parties that failed to clear the 5% threshold from seat allocation. The second factor is "excessive seats". These factors can be separated through the following procedure. If we calculate the leader's share of votes as a percentage of votes cast for parties that qualified for seat allocation, the difference between this share and the leader's share of seats reveals the proportionality distortion at the seat allocation stage (which before 2013 was determined mainly by "excessive seats"). The remaining portion of the bonus is a consequence of the 5% threshold.

Analysis shows that in a vast majority of cases, the threshold factor was dominant. This is indirectly evident even from the fact that our calculated Loosemore–Hanby index (the simplest and most accessible disproportionality index) nearly always equaled the difference between 100% and the vote share received by parties that qualified for seat allocation. The Loosemore–Hanby index is calculated as half the sum of absolute differences between the vote share and the seat share [6: 58-62; 7: 443]. In cases when seats are distributed with high proportionality among parties that cleared the threshold, all such parties receive a seat share larger than their vote share, and the sum of deviations for these parties equals the total vote share of parties that failed to clear the threshold. If these two sums are added together and then halved, the result equals either one of these sums.

As for "excessive seats," their number was generally small. From 1965 to 1976 there were none at all, and in six other campaigns that took place before German reunification, there were no more than five. The situation began to change after 1990, with most "excessive seats" between 1990-2005 emerging in eastern states.

Our analysis reveals several factors that favour the emergence of "excessive seats". First, electoral homogeneity (i.e., similar vote returns across constituencies within a state) helps parties supported by a relative majority of voters win most or even all single-seat constituencies (whereas strong heterogeneity allows candidates from other parties to win individual constituencies). The eastern states (except Berlin) proved more electorally homogeneous than western ones (except Bremen, Hamburg, and Saarland). Second, stronger competition and consequently greater vote dispersion enable candidates to win single-seat constituencies where the level of support is lower. In eastern states, competition was generally fiercer than in western ones, with The Left maintaining strong positions alongside the CDU and SPD. Third, before 2013 (that is, prior to the seat allocation reform), differences in voter turnout also played a role, as states with lower turnout gained fewer seats. That said, eastern states consistently demonstrated lower voter turnout than western states.

The situation changed in 2009 when the number of "excessive seats" sharply increased and they all went to the CDU and CSU. Most of these seats emerged in western states — 10 in Baden-Württemberg and 3 in Bavaria. "Tactical" voting may have played some role in this case: FDP voters may have supported CDU or CSU candidates in single-seat constituencies (admittedly, such voting had occurred before). Following this, the Federal Constitutional Court demanded limits on "excessive seats". However, German legislators chose a different approach, and in 2013 introduced several legal amendments, the main one being the introduction of "levelling seats" [7: 222-223; 9].

As Table 1 shows, the highest number of "excessive seats" won by one party occurred in 1994 (12 for CDU/CSU), 1998 (13 for SPD) and 2009 (24 for CDU/CSU). Calculations reveal that in 1994, CDU/CSU's total bonus amounted to 2.3 pp: 0.8 from "excessive seats" and 1.5 from the threshold. In 1998, SPD's total bonus reached 3.62 pp, with 1.06 from "excessive seats" and 2.56 from the threshold. Only in 2009 did "excessive seats" contribute substantially: CDU/CSU's 4.63 pp bonus included 2.47 from "excessive seats" and 2.16 from the threshold.

The introduction of "levelling seats" made seat allocation among qualifying parties more strictly proportional. However, disproportionality caused by excluding parties that did not clear the threshold became worse at the same time.

Table 1 shows that this problem was virtually nonexistent in West Germany in 1960s–1980s. Even in the 1950s, besides the three established parties, there were other parties (the German Party in particular) that received a certain level of support. From 1961 to 1980, only three parties entered the Bundestag (CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP), while all other parties received insignificant shares of vote (totaling about 1% in 1972 and 1976, slightly more in other years). Beginning in 1983, The Greens started to clear the threshold, keeping the share of "lost" votes small.

After German reunification, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) started gaining representation repeatedly, although its share was borderline small. It won 5.1% in 1998 and only 4.4% in 1994 (it still qualified for seat allocation in 1994 by winning four single-seat constituencies). However, in 2002 it secured just 4% and two direct seats, thus failing to qualify for seat allocation. Later, the PDS merged with left-wing social democrats to form The Left party, which consistently succeeded from 2005 onward (though in 2021 it was once again due to single-seat constituency wins: with 4.9% party-list votes, it nearly missed the threshold, but was rescued by the three-direct-seats rule, like in 1994).

However, in 2013, as many as two parties narrowly missed the threshold while failing to win any single-seat constituencies. One was the election veteran FDP with 4.8%, the other the rising AfD with 4.7%. Combined, these parties' lost votes totaled 9.5%, reaching 15.7% when joined by other minor parties — an unprecedented case in Germany's electoral history. Consequently, as was noted earlier, the CDU/CSU bloc gained a 7.9% bonus, falling just 0.6% short of an absolute majority.

In 2017, both parties entered the Bundestag (the AfD for the first time), consolidating their success in 2021. But 2025 saw a repeat of two parties (one being the same old FDP, the other a newcomer) nearly missing the threshold.

The 2023 electoral reform

In 2023, German legislators decided to introduce an update of electoral legislation more radical than any update in previous decades was. First, they decided to eliminate "overhang seats" altogether. This inevitably raised the question of how one should handle situations where a party wins more direct seats than it would under proportional allocation.

At least two options were possible. The first was the approach implemented in Russia's draft Electoral Code [4: 56, 370-371]. It would let a party keep the direct seats they won, exclude the party from proportional seat allocation, and allocate remaining seats among other parties. The allocation method in our draft was proposed for the federal level. In Germany's case, such a rule could seemingly have been implemented at the federal state level. While this would have caused some disproportionality, German lawmakers rejected the possibility of violating proportional representation.

They chose a different approach, and quite a radical one at that. Their approach was to abandon the requirement that every single-seat constituency must elect a representative. Under the new rules, a party winning more single-seat constituencies than its proportional share now has to forfeit these "excessive seats". This is implemented by compiling a rating of outsider candidates, with those at the bottom losing their seats [3; 10].

In abandoning "overhang seats", German lawmakers were motivated by a reluctance to inflate the Bundestag: its inflation does not only increases legislative costs (which Germany can live with) but also makes its work more complicated. There was a time when German legal scholars argued that parliament's functionality carries significant value, and warrants certain sacrifices (for example, the introduction of the 5% threshold was justified in this manner) [11].

Upon that, the legislators adjusted the number of seats in the Bundestag. The number of single-seat constituencies remained at 299, but the the total number of seats was set at 630. Consequently, with no "excessive seats," list seats should amount to 331, though this figure may be increased to compensate for any shortfall in direct seats.

Another reform element was abandoning the rule that allowed parties to qualify for seat allocation by winning at least three single-seat constituencies. As was noted earlier, this regulation had enabled the PDS and The Left to gain proper representation in 1994 and 2021. They secured 30 seats (instead of 4) in 1994 and 39 seats (instead of 3) in 2021. Thus, the legislative innovation was primarily designed to reduce representation of The Left — a party mainstream political forces are hesitant to join forces with.

Some researchers also suggested the innovation might backfire against the CSU [3; 10]. Until now, this party has consistently cleared the 5% nationwide threshold despite only running lists in Bavaria. Still, Bavarian votes alone were always enough to clear the threshold. Some may have anticipated support for the party would decline in future elections, though growth seemed more plausible.

However, in July 2024, Germany’s Constitutional Court ruled this innovation unconstitutional, preserving the three-direct-seat qualification rule for the 2025 elections. The court upheld the reform’s core element — abandoning "overhang seats" — as acceptable [3].

The 2025 election

The results of the 2025 Bundestag elections are presented in Table 2. Seven parties entered parliament technically, while in fact the number of parties that received full parliamentary representation amounted to five: the South Schleswig Voters' Association (SSW) is a recognized minority party (exempt from the 5% threshold) was given one seat, and the CDU and CSU are considered as a single bloc (consistent with previous elections).

The CDU/CSU bloc led once again with 28.5%, but the AfD came in second for the first time, pushing the SPD to third place. The Greens and The Left entered the Bundestag without difficulty. However, the FDP saw a repeat of 2013 scenario where it failed to clear the threshold, this time receiving only 4.3%. The new Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) also fell short by a mere 0.02 pp.

All other parties remained failed to register any meaningful support. The Free Voters party trailed far behind the FDP with 1.5%, while other parties received less than 1%: three parties between 0.5 and 1%, and sixteen less than 0.2%.

Collectively, parties failing to clear the threshold accounted for 13.7% of votes, making the Loosemore–Hanby index 13.7%. Of this number, 9.3% represented votes lost by BSW and FDP, with only 4.4% going to obvious outsiders.

We can also see that debates about the three-direct-seat exemption rule from the 5% threshold remained purely theoretical, as predicted [10]. Both The Left and CSU cleared the threshold with ease this time. Meanwhile, the BSW and FDP, who did not clear the threshold at all, could not secure a single direct seat.

But what was the role of the regulation that abolished "overhang seats" in all this? It would be tempting to calculate hypothetical results under the rules that were in effect in 2013–2021. Such a calculation proved difficult to make, however. First, those rules would require to determine each state's minimum seat allocation as a first step, and that requires obtaining then-current population data. Second, the calculation algorithm lacks strict codification, and it is interactive — that is, it performs until it achieves a goal: each party has to receive no fewer than its minimum determined seats, and the distribution in general should be proportional to the number of second votes.

In 2013 and 2017, the goal of proportionality was achieved. In 2013, the maximum absolute deviation between vote shares (calculated from parties qualifying for seat allocation) and seat shares reached 0.09 pp (for the CSU). The 2017 results were even more precise: the peak deviation was merely 0.04 pp (for the CDU, The Greens and AfD simultaneously).

However, the 2021 election failed to maintain this precision. The CSU secured three "excessive seats" that could not be fully compensated by "levelling seats". Consequently, while receiving 5.66% of votes (from the vote sum of parties that qualified for seat allocation), the CSU received 6.11% of seats, which amounted to 0.45 pp deviation. This reduced the shares for the SPD (by 0.18 pp), The Greens (by 0.11 pp), and four other parties by a smaller margin.

I did not find an explanation for this, there is just a factual observation that the CSU retains its seat surplus [1]. Calculations indicate that a more complete proportionality would have required expanding the Bundestag to 795 members. This may have instigated the reform.

The 2025 election again produced nearly perfect proportional representation. The maximum absolute deviation between vote shares (from vote sum for parties that qualified for seat allocation) and seat shares stood at 0.11 pp (for the CDU), with the CSU showing a smaller deviation (0.06 pp in the opposite direction), and the remaining five parties exhibiting even smaller deviations.

This outcome was achieved by denying seats to candidates who won single-seat constituencies. In total, there were 23 such candidates: 15 from the CDU (6 in Baden-Württemberg, 5 in Hesse, 3 in Rhineland-Palatinate and 1 in Schleswig-Holstein); 3 from the CSU in Bavaria; 4 from the AfD (1 each in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt and Saxony); and 1 from the SPD in Bremen. The winners in these constituencies became "reserve deputies".

The results for "reserve deputies" ranged from 24.7% (a CDU candidate in constituency No. 275, Baden-Württemberg) to 34.4% (a CDU candidate in constituency No. 277, Baden-Württemberg). The results for 11 out of 23 such deputies were below 30% [14].

Discussion notes

Now, the objectives of electoral reform can be considered achieved. The Bundestag's size has been stabilized while maintaining proportional representation. However, several unresolved issues merit discussion.

Chief among these is the absence of representatives for certain constituencies. This violates the rights of voters in these constituences by leaving them without territorial representation. It is easy enough to understand that unrepresented constituencies tend to be the most politically pluralistic (where the leading candidate receives less than 35%).

Clearly, this outcome is the price paid for proportional seat allocation. This raises fundamental questions. What is the purpose of proportional distribution? What constitutes the proportionality criterion? What exact parameters should seat allocation correspond to?

As we see, the share of seats corresponds almost exactly to the share of votes from the total votes cast for parties eligible for seat allocation. Yet does this not seem like conceptual distortion? When we calculate the share of votes relative to either the number of valid ballots or the number of participating voters (with a share of invalid ballots so small as in Germany, the difference is insignificant), we obtain the true expression of the voters’ will. And it is this expressed will, we believe, that should serve as the benchmark for comparing the results of seat allocation (i.e., election results).

This approach reveals the importance of the difference between seat shares and vote shares calculated from all valid ballots. As we may see, this difference is determined by the vote share of parties excluded from seat allocation (and is calculated as the Loosemore–Hanby index). This raises a reasonable question: is such meticulous matching of seat shares to vote shares (down to tenths of a percentage point) among qualifying parties justified, when the deviation from total valid votes reaches 3–4 (or even 8) percentage points?

I do not set myself the task of giving advice to German lawmakers. However, I have some ideas that could benefit lawmakers in countries looking to adopt the German system.

The first thing that is evident is the excessive nature of the 5% threshold. It leads (for the second time now) to the exclusion from representation of parties that enjoy the support of a significant number of voters. If the threshold were lowered to 4 percent, these parties would pass with ease, while minor parties, which represent very few people, would still be excluded. The number of lost votes would then be reduced by a factor of two or even three. I have previously offered additional arguments for reducing the electoral threshold to 4% or 3% [7: 349–352].

The high threshold is often justified as a way to keep radical parties out of parliament — parties that mainstream political forces consider unacceptable as coalition partners [7: 344–345]. However, in reality we see that both The Left and AfD now consistently surpass the threshold, and BSW nearly did, too. Conversely, the FDP — which has traditionally formed coalitions with either CDU or SPD — has failed to pass the threshold for the second time now.

Another significant issue (already mentioned above) concerns "excessive seats" (in this case, seats not given to district winners). However, we must immediately note that this issue largely stems from applying proportional distribution not just nationally but within each individual state. For Germany, this approach appears essential. But I would argue that it is unnecessary even for federal states with less developed federal tradition (like Russia).

Had the comparison between a party's proportional entitlement and its single-seat constituency wins been conducted at the national level, the issue would generally not exist. In 2025, all parties except the CSU had more entitled seats than constituency wins. However, if we consider the CDU and CSU as a single party (which is certainly justifiable), their combined total amounts to 190 constituency wins, while the number of proportional seats they are entitled amounts to 208. Therefore, even in this scenario, no issue of "excessive seats" would have occured.

Yet even if the issue persists, there also exist several approaches to solving it. Germany has already tested three such approaches: 1) allowing parties to keep "excessive mandates"; 2) allowing "excessive seats" while adding "leveling seats" for other parties; 3) stripping parties of "excessive seats". There is a possible fourth approach (outlined in our draft Russian Electoral Code [Izbiratelny kodeks RF 2011: 56, 370–371]): let parties retain the seats they won in constituencies, then distribute remaining seats among other parties in proportion to second votes.

This could be illustrated using the 2025 Bundestag election in Baden-Württemberg as an example, where 79 seats were allocated. According to the Sainte-Laguë method, the CDU was proportionally entitled to 29 seats, yet it had won 35 constituencies. Under the proposed approach, the CDU would retain all 35 seats, with remaining seats recalculated. This would result in the AfD receiving 16 seats (instead of 18), the SPD 12 (instead of 13), the Greens 11 (instead of 13), and The Left 5 (instead of 6).

Naturally, redistributing six seats has a significant impact within the scope of a single state. However, at the national level, the CDU/CSU bloc would have gained only 18 "excessive seats", which amounts to a 2.9 pp deviation that is smaller than distortions caused by the 5% threshold. Moreover, it seems likely that the CDU/CSU's would win less than 18 seats: the bloc would have lost several more seats in states where the AfD secured "excessive seats".

Ultimately, this brings us back to reconsidering the very purpose of the mixed-member proportional (personalized proportional) system. The purpose is to simultaneously achieve two objectives: 1) proportional seat allocation reflecting voter preferences; 2) parliamentary composition determined not only by party decisions but also by direct voter choice. However, our analysis reveals the second objective is only partially fulfilled.

Let us revisit the 2025 election results. The CDU obtained 164 seats, comprising 128 constituency seats and 36 list seats. the SPD — 120 seats (44 constituency and 76 list); the AfD — 152 seats (42 constituency and 110 list). Consequently, for these three parties, the composition of their parliamentary factions substantially depends on voter choices.

The CSU presents a unique case, having won all 44 of its seats exclusively through constituencies. It would seem that the parliamentary delegation was fully determined by Bavarian voters. However, there are only 47 constituencies in Bavaria, with CSU candidates winning all of them, although three candidates were denied seats as the party's proportional entitlement amounted to 44 seats only. That is, voter preferences did play a role, but their impact was limited.

As for the Greens and The Left, the former had only 12 of their 85 deputies elected through constituencies, while the latter had only 6 out of 64. This means that voter preferences played a minimal role in shaping these parties' parliamentary delegations.

However, the 2025 election differs markedly from previous cycles in this regard. In 2021, the ratios were even less favorable in terms of voter influence: only the SPD (121 of 206) and CDU (98 of 152) had substantial shares of constituency-elected deputies, while the CSU again saw all 45 of its deputies elected locally. Other parties had few deputies elected in constituencies: 16 of 118 for the Greens, 16 of 83 for AfD, 3 of 39 for The Left and none of 92 for the FDP.

In our earlier discussion of this issue, we suggested several potential approaches to solving it. One approach would replace single-seat constituencies with two- or three-seat constituencies with one vote per voter. This would help mid-level parties secure more direct seats.

Another suggestion was more radical: "Given that constituencies do not exist in isolation but are integrated into a mixed-member proportional system where constiruency wins should not distort the parliamentary party balance, we can further abandon certain principles inherent to majority and semi-proportional systems. Specifically, we might abandon the rule stipulating 'a predetermined number of deputies from each constituency'. Instead, seats could be allocated based on candidates meeting a vote threshold (over 25%, for example), regardless of their ranking.

If we also reject the principle of 'equal clearance conditions for all party candidates,' we could, for instance, stipulate that a fixed portion of seats (half or more) for each party is allocated to candidates based on constituency performance (in descending order of vote share) and the remaining seats are assigned based on their position on the party list. Alternatively, the ratio of list candidates to constituency candidates could be tied to the number of votes cast for the list and for the candidates. This would ensure that for all parties that got into the parliament, the composition of their delegation reflects voter preferences [7: 591].

Another study concluded that the model proposing three-seat constituencies and single non-transferable vote in majority voting is the most viable. This model allows parties other than the leading three to secure seats in such a way that all of the parties admitted to seat allocation can directly put at least half of their candidates into the elective body [8].

We can now see that Germany has effectively abandoned the following principles: "a predetermined number of deputies from each constituency" and "equal clearance conditions for all party candidates". This is evidenced by the fact that while some constituencies elect one deputy, others may elect none. Moreover, a candidate's election does not depend only on votes in their specific single-seat constituency, but also on their party's performance in other constituencies.

This approach creates opportunities for more fundamental modifications to the mixed-member proportional system, including those outlined in earlier research [7: 589–591; 8].

Received 26.03.2025, revision received 09.04.2025.

---

References

1. Erläuterung des Verfahrens der Umrechnung von Wählerstimmen in Bundestagssitze mit dem endgültigen Wahlergebnis der Bundestagswahl 2021. – Die Bundeswahlleiterin, official website. URL: https://bundeswahlleiterin.de/dam/jcr/e9eb08cc-e19e-4caa-b9f7-c69247872344/btw21_erl_sitzzuteilung.pdf (accessed 26.03.2025). (In Ger.) - https://bundeswahlleiterin.de/dam/jcr/e9eb08cc-e19e-4caa-b9f7-c69247872344/btw21_erl_sitzzuteilung.pdf
2. Fakhretdinova A. Izbiratelnaya sistema Germanii v resheniyakh Konstitutsionnogo suda FRG [Germany's Electoral System Through the Rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court]. – Zhurnal o vyborakh. 2008. No. 6. P. 53–57. (In Russ.)
3. Ivanova A. Sud: Reforma izbiratelnogo prava narushayet Osnovnoi zakon [Court Says Election Law Reform Violates the Basic Law]. – DW, 30.07.2024. URL: https://www.dw.com/ru/sud-reforma-izbiratelnogo-prava-casticno-narusaet-osnovnoj-zakon-frg/a-69806645 (accessed 26.03.2025). (In Russ.) - https://www.dw.com/ru/sud-reforma-izbiratelnogo-prava-casticno-narusaet-osnovnoj-zakon-frg/a-69806645
4. Izbiralenlyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii – osnova modernizatsii politicheskoi sistemy Rossii [Electoral Code of the Russian Federation as a Basis for Upgrading Russia's Political System] / Ed. by A.E. Lyubarev. M.: GOLOS, 2011. 460 p. (In Russ.)
5. Leibo Yu.I. Izbiratelnaya sistema Germanii [Electoral System of Germany]. – Sovremennye izbiratelnye sistemy. Vyp. 2: Argentina, Germaniya, Shvetsiya [Modern Electoral Systems. Vol. 2: Argentina, Germany, Sweden]. M.: RTsOIT: Norma, 2007. P. 107–189. (In Russ.)
6. Lijphart A. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 209 p.
7. Lyubarev A.E. Izbiratelnyye sistemy: rossiiskii i mirovoi opyt [Electoral Systems: Russian and International Experience]. M.: ROO "Liberalnaya missiya"; Novoye literaturnoye obozreniye. 2016. 632 p. (In Russ.)
8. Lyubarev A.E. Modification Proposals for a Mixed Compensatory Electoral System: A Model Study. – Electoral Politics. 2021. No. 1 (5). P. 4. - https://electoralpolitics.org/en/articles/varianty-modifikatsii-smeshannoi-sviazannoi-izbiratelnoi-sistemy-modelnoe-issledovanie/
9. Lyubarev A.E. Sravneniye germanskoi i rossiyskoi izbiratelnykh sistem [Comparison of the Russian and German legal systems]. – Legal Studies. 2013. No. 11. P. 1–29. DOI: 10.7256/2305-9699.2013.11.1013. (In Russ.)
10. Lyubarev A. Ob izbiratelnoi reforme v Germanii [On Germany's Electoral Reform]. – A. Lyubarev's LiveJournal, 25.03.2023. URL: https://lyubarev.livejournal.com/125001.html (accessed 26.03.2025). (In Russ.) - https://lyubarev.livejournal.com/125001.html
11. Meier G. Demokraticheskiye vybory i izbiratelnaya sistema [Democratic Elections and the Electoral System]. – Gosudarstvennoye pravo Germanii [German State Law]. Vol. 1. M.: IGP RAN, 1994. P. 121–151. (In Russ.)
12. Rumyantsev A. "Izbytochnye" mandaty i problema legitimnosti v nemetskom izbiratelnom prave ["Overhang" Seats and the Problem of Legitimacy in German Electoral Law]. – Sravnitelnoye konstitutsionnoye obozreniye [Comparative Constitutional Review]. 2009. No. 6 (73). P. 5–15. (In Russ.)
13. Vedeneyev Yu.A., Vasilyev A.V. Sravnitelny analiz izbiratelnykh sistem Rossii i Germanii [Russia and Germany: A Comparative Analysis of Electoral Systems]. – Zhurnal o vyborakh. 2001. No. 4. P. 22–26. (In Russ.)
14. Wahl zum 21 Deutschen Bundestag am 23 Februar 2025. Heft 3. Endgültige Ergebnisse nach Wahlkreisen. – Die Bundeswahlleiterin, official website. URL: https://bundeswahlleiterin.de/dam/jcr/5316c01c-8a1e-44d0-8075-eab495f466b6/btw25_heft3.pdf (accessed 26.03.2025). (In Ger.) - https://bundeswahlleiterin.de/dam/jcr/5316c01c-8a1e-44d0-8075-eab495f466b6/btw25_heft3.pdf